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Liberty and Property in the Supreme
Court: A Defense of Roth
and Perry
Peter N. Simont
The due process clauses of the Constitution require procedural
protection if the government deprives an individual of "life, liberty, or
property."' The Supreme Court might have defined "life, liberty, or
property" broadly, as one commentator has suggested, as "a unitary
concept embracing all interests valued by sensible men."2 Under this
definition, virtually any governmental deprivation would implicate one
of the due process clauses. Instead, the Court has chosen to give these
terms fairly narrow definition, thereby limiting the range of govern-
mental activities subject to judicial supervision under the due process
clauses.
This definitional process, at least with regard to "property," began
with the 1972 cases of Board of Regents v. Roth' and Perry v.
Sindermann.4 In Roth, the Court held that government benefits are
fourteenth amendment "property" only when the recipient has a legiti-
mate expectation, grounded in state law, that he will continue receiving
such benefits. In Perry, the Court held that where such a substantive
property right to a government benefit is established, the courts, not the
legislature creating the right, have the final word on the constitutional
need for and sufficiency of the procedural protections afforded it. The
Perry-Roth doctrine can be stated succinctly: legislatures create prop-
erty, and courts protect it.
In the cases raising similar issues that have followed Roth and
Perry, the Court has adhered to that formulation with remarkable con-
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sistency.5 Nevertheless, academics have been uniformly critical of the
Court's approach. This Article undertakes the task of defending and
explaining the Roth-Perry doctrine and answering its critics. I believe
that the Roth-Perry approach is the right one-but even if it is not, it is
important that the reasons for its adoption and durability be
understood.
Part I of the Article discusses the background to Roth and Perry,
the cases themselves, and the possible alternatives the Court might
have adopted. Part II defends the Roth-Perry doctrine. It argues that
the doctrine maintains the proper role of administrative discretion in
disbursement of government benefits by separating substance, which is
properly the states' province, from procedure, which has as final arbiter
the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the Roth-Perry rule is consistent
with the historical understanding of "property." Finally, Part III re-
sponds to the scholarly critics of Roth and Perry.
I
BACKGROUND
A. The Emergence of Procedural Limitations on Denial of
Government Benets
Before World War II, the provisions of the due process clauses
imposed few restraints-either substantive or procedural-upon the
government in its dispensation of benefits. Quite simply, government
benefits were not viewed as fourteenth amendment "property." Justice
Holmes' oft-quoted epigram captured the order of the day: "The peti-
tioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman."6 The great freedom accorded
governments acting in what might loosely be referred to as their propri-
etary role7 seems adequately explained by two commonplace observa-
5. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488-91 (1980), and cases cited therein. The only
exception is New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978). This consistency is,
I believe, unequaled in any other area. Cf. Cox, The Supreme Court, 1979 Terma-Foreword" Free-
dom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1, 24-26 (1980) (discussing the Court's
inconsistency in first amendment cases).
6. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892). Jus-
tice Holmes' epigram captures so well the mood of this period, that no discussion of "unconstitu-
tional conditions," no matter how brief, is complete without it. Professor Robert O'Neil described
it as "[t]he most durable statement of the 'privilege' concept, if not the soundest." O'Neil, Uncon-
stitutional Conditions: Welfare Benoftts with Strings 4ttached, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 443, 445 n.l l
(1966).
7. Professor Van Alstyne puts the matter more precisely: "[A government acts in a proprie-
tary capacity] when the state acts as owner, proprietor, employer, contractor, or otherwise in a
manner more characteristic of the private sector than of government." Van Alstyne, Cracks in
"The New Property Adjudicative Due Process in the 4dministrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV.
445, 448 (1977). As an extreme statement of this position, he quotes the following passage from
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tions. First, when the Supreme Court construed the fourteenth
amendment's due process guarantee, it was considerably more con-
cerned with protecting traditional property rights than with protecting
the dignitary and political rights which so occupy the present Court's
attention. Second, government benefits were much less important then
than they are now. These differences made it possible to live with doc-
trines that sharply distinguished between government regulation of pri-
vate property rights, which was closely supervised by the Court, and
government disbursement of benefits, which was not.'
The most obvious consequence of the right-privilege distinction
was the extensive freedom it allowed governments in their daily activi-
ties. Subject only to the then-minimal requirements of the equal pro-
tection clause,9 governments could regulate, employ, contract, and
provide services using almost any criteria-and almost any (or almost
no) procedures. As early as the decision in Pennoyer v. NO,' 0 the due
process- guarantee was viewed as providing procedural protection of
traditional property; due process protection of an expected government
benefit, however, was not even within the pale of consideration.
The earliest changes in this area took the form of the Court's rec-
ognition that governments are bound by the substantive requirements
of the Constitution, even in their proprietary roles." In a series of
cases beginning shortly after World War II,12 the Court established that
even ephemeral expectations of government benefits could not be de-
nied on a substantive basis that seriously interfered with conduct pro-
tected by provisions of the Constitution. These decisions, however,
were aimed at protecting substantive constitutional rights (freedom of
expression, free exercise of religion, and the fifth amendment right not
to incriminate oneself), not at protecting the individual's right to the
the Tennessee Supreme Court's opinion affirming the conviction of Scopes in the famous "mon-
key trial": "In dealing with its own employees engaged upon its own work, the State is not ham-
pered by the limitations of ... the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States." Id. at 447-48 (quoting Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 112, 289 S.W. 363, 365 (1927)
(emphasis added by Van Alstyne)).
8. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 742 (1964); Van Alstyne, The Demise of
the Right-Privilege Doctrine in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1444-47 (1968).
9. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
10. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
11. Part of this change encompassed the Court's rejection of the right-privilege distinction.
Leading and informative discussions of that rejection include: French, Unconstitutional Cond-
tions An Analysis, 50 GEo. L.J. 234 (1961); Linde, Justice Douglas on Freedom in the Wefare
State" ConstitutionalRights in the Public Sector, 39 WAsH. L. REV. 4 (1964); O'Neil, supra note 6;
Van Alstyne, supra note 8; Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960).
12. Justice Stewart, writing for the Court in Perry v. Sindermarm, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972),
apparently dates the development to United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947).
'See also Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926).
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benefit itself.'3
By 1970, the disbursement of governmental benefits was subject to
considerable judicial limitation, although the restrictions were still re-
lated almost exclusively to the protection of substantive constitutional
rights. These new limitations gradually led to acquiescence in judicial
supervision of the daily activities of government; it was no longer quite
so acceptable to justify nonsupervision by arguing that the govern-
ment's right to discontinue benefit programs altogether carried with it
the right to operate the program in any fashion it considered appropri-
ate.' 4 In turn, the gradual development of substantive due process lim-
itations inevitably forced the issue of whether or not procedural due
process limitations were also applicable to the denial of government
benefits. Indeed, some of the cases enforcing substantive limitations
actually imposed procedural requirements as a means of ensuring that
substantive constitutional rights would not be impaired.'
5
A simultaneous and enormous increase in the variety and impor-
tance of government benefits added substantial impetus toward ex-
tending procedural due process requirements to cover the disbursement
of these benefits. While the role of government benefits in the lives of
Americans had been increasing gradually since the beginning of the
New Deal, President Johnson's Great Society introduced an unprece-
dented expansion of government programs.'
6
Finally, both the legal literature and popular discussion increas-
ingly promoted the view that receiving benefits was one of the rights of
the needy, not simply a gratuity dispensed by a charitable government.
The legal literature was particularly insistent in its claim that receipt of
government largess was entitled to judicial protection. Expectations of
government benefits were "the new property," and preservation of indi-
vidual freedom required, above all else, that the new property be pro-
vided systematic substantive and procedural protection against
government arbitrariness, caprice, and worse.
17
13. See, e.g., Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968) (self-incrimination); Sherbert v. Ver-
ner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (free exercise of religion); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (freedom
of expression).
14. For an example of such a justification, see Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Consti-
tutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321, 321-22 (1935): "If I have no ground for complaint at
being denied a privilege absolutely, it is difficult to see how I acquire such a ground merely be-
cause the state, instead of denying me a privilege outright, offers me an alternative, however
harsh."
15. See, eg., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
16. See generally S. LEVITAN, THE GREAT SOCIETYS POOR LAW 3-47 (1969). The key legis-
lation was the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, which included a number of special programs.
Other pertinent legislation included the Housing Acts of 1965 and 1968, the Medicare bill of 1965,
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, and the Demonstration Cities and Metro-
politan Development Act of 1966.
17. The leading article in this area was Reich, supra note 8. Others included Law of the
1983]
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B. Cases Developing Supreme Court Doctrine
1. Goldberg v. Kelly
The Supreme Court made its first serious effort to deal with the
"new property" in Goldberg v. Kelly. 8 Plaintiffs, welfare recipients in
New York City, sued to establish that New York's welfare termination
procedures were constitutionally inadequate under the due process
clause. The case did not in fact present the issue of whether welfare
benefits were within the "life, liberty or property" protected by the due
process clauses, because defendants conceded that "the protections of
the due process clause apply." 19 Nevertheless, in his opinion for the
Court, Justice Brennan addressed the issue. Drawing heavily on the
"new property" literature,20 Justice Brennan suggested that whether the
right to continue receiving a government benefit was within the protec-
tion of the due process clause turned upon the importance of the benefit
to the individual-that is, the extent to which loss of the benefit would
be "grievous."'" Welfare, Justice Brennan reasoned, is among the most
important benefits government has to offer. Goldberg was widely
viewed as an important first step toward the adoption of a rule that
government benefits-at least important ones-are fourteenth amend-
ment property.22
Poor, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 319 (1966). But see Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Wefare
Administration, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 479 (1966) (criticizing Reich's approach).
18. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
19. The district court stated the following:
Defendants do not deny plaintiffs' general propositions that the terminations here under
attack amount to "state action" and that the protections of the due process clause apply.
Nor do defendants attempt to argue that welfare benefits are a "privilege," rather than a
right, and that therefore they may fix the procedures of termination as they see fit.
Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
20. Justice Brennan cited Reich's New Property article, supra note 8, and quoted extensively
from Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE! L.J. 1245
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Individual Rights]. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8
(1970).
21. 397 U.S. at 263. The full sentence is as follows:
The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced
by the extent to which he may be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss,' Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), and
depends upon whether the recipient's interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the govern-
mental interest in summary adjudication.
Read literally, the opinion appears to relate "grievous loss" not to the question of whether the due
process clause applies, but to the question of "the extent to which procedural due process must be
afforded" to the recipient. 397 U.S. at 262-63. This would appear to be addressed to which partic-
ular protections ought to be provided---"how much" rather than "whether." But subsequent opin-
ions have read Goldberg for the proposition that the availability vel non of due process protection
turns on "grievous loss," and in context this seems a fair if not entirely literal reading of the
sentence in question.
22. See Escalera v. New York City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 861-63 (2d Cir. 1970); Sostre
v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 871-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Davis v. Toledo Metropolitan Hous.
Auth., 311 F. Supp. 795, 796-97 (N.D. Ohio 1970). Professor O'Neil, in contrast, perceived "a
[Vol. 71:146
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2. Roth and Perry
Two years after Goldberg, in Board of Regents v. Roth2 3 and Perry
v. Sindermann,24 the Court rejected the implication in the Goldberg dic-
tum that whether or not a benefit was fourteenth amendment "prop-
erty" turned on the importance of the benefit. The method of analysis
the Court adopted in these two cases has proven far more durable than
the Goldberg approach.
In Roth, the plaintiff was a Wisconsin state university teacher
whose one-year contract had not been renewed. He challenged the
nonrenewal partly on the ground that the university's failure to provide
a statement of reasons and a hearing violated his right to procedural
due process." The district court (per Judge James Doyle) granted
Roth's summary judgment motion on the basis of his procedural due
process claim; the Seventh Circuit affimed. The Supreme Court re-
versed the grant of summary judgment.
Roth was untenured. The relevant Wisconsin statute provided
that all state university teachers would be on probation until they had
served continuously for four years. The Supreme Court held that the
probationary nature of Roth's position meant that Roth did not have a
fourteenth amendment property interest in his job. The Court did not
look to the "importance" of the benefit; if it had, it would likely have
decided the other way, since employment is surely important. Rather,
the Court found its answer by looking to Wisconsin law. Because Roth
was hired for a year only, without any promise that his employment
would continue beyond that period, Roth's expectation of reemploy-
ment was not "property" and was therefore not within the protection of
the due process clause. Accordingly, Roth was not entitled to any pro-
cedural protections over and above those-if any-provided by state
law. Roth's substantive interest was "created and defined by the terms
of his appointment,"26 and the Court looked to those state-law terms to
determine whether or not Roth's expectation was "property."27
The plaintiff in Perry, Robert Sindermann, was also a state college
teacher whose contract had not been renewed; like Roth, he received
lurking implication" that "the Court has begun compiling a rank order or priority list of govern-
ment benefits." O'Neil, Of Justice Delayed and Justice Denied- The Welfare Prior Hearing Cases,
1970 Sup. CT. REv. 161, 180-81.
23. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
24. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
25. Roth also alleged that his termination was invalid because it transgressed a substantive
limitation. He charged that he had been fired because of protected first amendment activity. This
charge, however, was not before the Supreme Court; the district court had stayed proceedings on
that issue pending Supreme Court review of the summary judgment. 408 U.S. at 574.
26. Id. at 578.
27. Id at 577.
19831
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no notice, hearing, or statement of reasons. Sindermann had been em-
ployed by the Texas state college system for ten years, but always under
one-year contracts. He, too, challenged his nonrenewal partly on pro-
cedural due process grounds. The district court entered summary judg-
ment against him, the Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court, and the
Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit.
Documents issued by his employer suggested that Sindermann,
though not tenured, was in fact entitled by state law to continuing re-
employment absent cause for nonrenewal; these documents, however,
did not provide procedural protections against nonrenewal. 28  The
Supreme Court held that whether or not Sindermann's expectation of
reemployment was due process "property" would turn upon whether or
not the substantive law of Texas gave Sindermann a "contractual or
other claim to job tenure."29 If Sindermann's interest were "property"
under this definition, he would be entitled to certain procedural protec-
tions under the fourteenth amendment, whether or not state law pro-
vided for such procedures.30
What are the principles that emerge from Roth and Perry? First,
taken together, the decisions delineate federal and state roles in the cre-
ation and protection of property rights. The states are given great lati-
tude to choose the substantive rights they want to establish. Once a
state creates an expectation which rises to the level of fourteenth
amendment "property," however, the federal courts, and not the states
themselves, will have ultimate control over the nature and sufficiency
of the procedures provided to protect that expectation.
Second, both Roth and Perry reject the Goldberg "importance"
test.31 They do not clearly indicate what will replace it-what kind of
28. One of these documents was the college's official Faculty Guide, which included the
following statement:
Teacher Tenure: Odessa College has no tenure system. The Administration of the Col-
lege wishes the faculty member to feel that he has permanent tenure as long as his teach-
ing services are satisfactory and as long as he displays a cooperative attitude toward his
co-workers and his superiors, and as long as he is happy in his work.
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 600 (1972); see also id at 600 n.6 (noting that the Texas college
and university system guidelines contained similar provisions for an expectation of employment).
29. Id at 602 n.7.
30. Id. at 602-03.
31. The opinions do not expressly overrule Goldberg's dictum. But in his discussion of
Goldberg in Roth, Justice Stewart (writing for the Court) performed a remarkable job of "plastic
surgery," Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 153 (1969) (Stewart, J.), upon that opinion's
holding. Gone entirely is Goldberg's consideration (in three places) of the importance of the gov-
ernnent benefit; instead, the result in Goldberg is rationalized by the fact that "the welfare recipi-
ents' 'property' interest in welfare payments was created and defined by statutory terms ......
Roth, 408 U.S. at 578. See also id. at 576 ("[A] person receiving welfare benefits under statutory
and administrative standards defining eligibility for them has an interest in continued receipt of
those benefits ...."); id. at 577 ("[T]he welfare recipients in Goldberg v. Kelly had a claim of
entitlement to welfare payments that was grounded in the statute defining eligibility for them.").
[Vol. 71:146
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state-law-based expectancy will be considered fourteenth amendment
"property." Rather, Justice Stewart's opinions for the Court proceed in
a "magisterial" style.32 Unlike more typically argumentative modem
opinions, they do not articulate either the policies which justify the di-
chotomy adopted in Perry and Roth or the test that will be used to
determine whether or not a particular expectation is fourteenth amend-
ment "property." All that is really clear in Roth and Perry is that the
Court will leave to the states the complex decisions concerning the
scope and nature of benefits they may choose to disburse, but will re-
serve for itself the determination of the procedures that must be pro-
vided once a state has created a protected expectation.
With the benefit of hindsight, we can now see the kind of test the
Court meant to impose in Roth and Perry. It turns upon the kind of
decision that will govern the continued receipt of the government bene-
fit. If, as in Roth, the legislation or regulations granting the benefit con-
dition its receipt upon the discretionary decision of an administrator,
the expectation of the benefit is not "property." Conversely, if, as was
alleged in Perry, continuing eligibility for the benefit turns, by state
law, upon the existence or nonexistence of particular facts, the expecta-
tion of the benefit is fourteenth amendment "property."
3. Arnett v. Kennedy
The Supreme Court has adhered with remarkable consistency to
the Roth-Perry doctrine. InArnett v. Kennedy,33 however, a plurality of
the Court, composed of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and
Rehnquist, proposed a different analysis.
Wayne Kennedy, the plaintiff, was a government employee fired
for making public statements to the effect that his immediate supervisor
had attempted to give a bribe.34 Kennedy sued, claiming that the pro-
This "plastic surgery" cannot hide the fact that the Court was consciously rejecting Goldberg when
it said that "to determine whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we must look
not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interests at stake." Id. at 570-71 (emphasis in the
original). It is nonetheless true that Goldberg's holding may stand consistent with Roth and Perry:
New York had set up statutory eligibility criteria for welfare benefits and therefore had eliminated
most unreviewable discretion.
32. Cf. Cardozo, Law and Literature, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 120, 123, 52 HARV. L. REV. 472,
475, 48 YALE L. J. 490, 493 (1939), who, after listing various styles of opinion writing, described
the magisterial style in this way:
I place first in order, for it is first in dignity and power, the type magisterial or
imperative. It eschews ornament. It is meager in illustration and analogy. If it argues, it
does so with the downward rush and overwhelming conviction of the syllogism, seldom
with tentative gropings towards the inductive apprehension of a truth imperfectly dis-
cered. We hear the voice of the law speaking by its consecrated ministers with the
calmness and assurance that are born of a sense of mastery and power. Thus Marshall
seemed to judge, and a hush falls upon us even now as we listen to his words.
33. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
34. Kennedy's statement was to the effect that his supervisor "had attempted to bribe Mr.
1983]
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cedures attending his termination had been constitutionally insuffi-
cient. Under the applicable civil service regulations, Kennedy's
pretermination hearing rights were limited to very informal proceed-
ings before his supervisor,35 who in this case was the very person whom
Kennedy had allegedly defamed. By contrast, the regulations provided
for very elaborate post-termination hearings before an impartial exam-
iner, as well as the right to reinstatement with backpay should the em-
ployee prevail.
Kennedy attacked the statutory procedures for their failure to pro-
vide a pretermination hearing before an impartial hearing officer. Al-
though the Court was unable to agree on a majority opinion, five of its
members concurred in the judgment rejecting his attack. Justice Rehn-
quist, joined in his plurality opinion by the Chief Justice and Justice
Stewart, agreed with all the other Justices that Kennedy's interest in his
federal classified civil service job was due process "property.' ' 36 None-
theless, he would have limited Kennedy to the procedural safeguards
provided by the statutes that created the substantive terms of his em-
ployment. Where, as here, it appeared that Congress had paid close
attention to the procedures that would be available when enacting the
legislation that created the job tenure, the substantive right, Justice
Rehnquist argued, could not be divorced from the procedures provided
for its enforcement: "[W]here the grant of a substantive right is inextri-
cably intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to
be employed in determining that right, a litigant in the position of ap-
pellee must take the bitter with the sweet."3 7
The other six Justices rejected Justice Rehnquist's analysis. In
their view, Roth and Perry required that if the benefit in question was
"property," the Court must independently determine the adequacy of
the procedures Congress provided. Justices Blackmun and Powell con-
cluded, after such an independent review, that the limited pretermina-
tion procedures provided by the statute were in fact constitutionally
adequate, in view of the extensive post-termination procedures avail-
James White Eagle Stewart by offering him a $100,000 grant of OEO funds if he would sign a
statement-against [Kennedy] ... " Id at 196-97 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
35. Id. The government provided the employee with the right to 30 days written "notice of
proposed adverse action," including "any and all reasons, specifically and in detail, for the pro-
posed action." He was then entitled to a reasonable time to submit a written answer, as well as the
right to make a personal appearance before an official who had authority either to make the final
decision or to recommend what final decision should be made-all prior to the making of the final
decision. These requirements were in addition to extensive post-termination evidentiary hearings.
36. Id. at 151-52 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart, J.). The same point was
made by each of the other Justices. Id. at 164-67 (Powell, J., concurring in part, joined by Black-
mun, J.); id. at 171, 184-86 (White, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 206, 207-11 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting, joined by Douglas and Brennan, JJ.).
37. Id. at 153-54 (plurality).
[Vol. 71:146
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able. Accordingly, they voted with the plurality to uphold the statute,
though theirs was a markedly different analysis. The other four Jus-
tices concluded that the procedures were in some regards constitution-
ally inadequate, and on that basis would have voted to uphold
Kennedy's attack.
The plurality's analysis is patently inconsistent with the Roth-
Perry reasoning. 8 It did not reject Perry and Roth outright; rather, the
opinion was carefully limited to situations in which the state or Con-
gress had, in the process of defining the scope of the substantive right,
given simultaneous and careful consideration to the procedures it
wanted to provide.3 9 Nonetheless, even if such a limitation were ulti-
mately feasible and capable of application,4" giving legislatures the
power to limit procedural rights is apro tanto retraction of the plenary
judicial power over procedure that the Court seemed to contemplate in
Roth and Perry.
This history, from Goldberg to Roth-Perry to Arnett, traces the
Supreme Court's progression from having no articulated doctrine on
the meaning of property under the fourteenth amendment to deciding
cases representing three separate positions. Three Justices (Brennan,
Marshall and Douglas) would follow the Goldberg reasoning and ac-
cord procedural due process protection to any "important" expectation
of government benefit, whether or not it turned upon the discretion of
an administrator. Three other Justices (White, Blackmun and Powell)
would follow Roth-Perry and accord procedural due process protection
to expectations of governmental benefits only (and always) when the
expectation was grounded in state law and conditional only upon the
existence of historical facts-not upon the discretion of an administra-
tor. Finally, three Justices (Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart
and Rehnquist) would adopt the Arnett plurality approach, and accord
procedural due process protection only to nondiscretionary benefits,
with the additional limitation that any protective procedures provided
by the legislature creating the interest would always be constitutionally
sufficient. Roth and Perry, taken together, define the middle ground of
these three possible positions. The Court has consistently looked not to
38. This is true even though Justice Stewart, the author of Ferry and Roth, joined Justice
Rebaquist's plurality opinion.
39. See id. at 152 ("where the focus of the legislation was thus strongly on the procedural
mechanism. . ."); id. at 153-54 ("where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined
with the limitations on the procedures. . ."). This point is made in Comment, No Hearing Re-
quired Prior to Dismissalfor Cause of Nonprobafionary Federal Employee, 59 MINN. L. REV. 42 1,
427-28 (1974).
40. Cf. Comment, supra note 39, at 427 ("Unfortunately the plurality opinion failed to offer




the reasoning of Goldberg or Arnett, but to the Roth-Perry analysis.
The response has been criticism from both sides: those who would take
a Goldberg-like approach condemn Roth for not providing enough pro-
cedural protection, while critics taking the Arnett position think that
the Perry Court went too far in reserving procedural determinations to
the courts. The next Part of this Article will address these criticisms by
making a case for the Roth-Perry approach.
II
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS-THE CASE FOR THE ROTH-PERRY
DOCTRINE
The above-mentioned criticisms present two questions. The first
question is whether Roth was wrong because it did not go far enough to
ensure that recipients of government benefits have sufficient procedural
protections. My answer is that Roth was right: many questions regard-
ing government benefits are properly committed to administrative dis-
cretion, which by its very nature is unreviewable through judicial
procedure. Moreover, the definition of "property" that Roth uses is
consistent with a well-established meaning of the word. The second
question is whether Perry was wrong to reserve the ultimate determina-
tion of minimal procedural protection to the courts, where the benefit
in question does not turn on the discretion of an administrator. Perry
too, was correct: the Court was simply treating "the new property" as it
had always treated traditional property for the purposes of the Consti-
tution's due process guarantee.
This Part presents these answers in detail. Although Roth and
Perry should be seen as a single doctrine, I have found it convenient to
defend them separately. I begin by answering the criticism that the
Court did not go far enough in Roth.
A. In Defense of Roth: A Response to Goldberg
I defend Roth on two bases. The first is a utilitarian defense based
on what would have happened had the Court decided the case differ-
ently. If the Court had included Roth-type expectations within the def-
inition of fourteenth amendment property, the immediate result would
have been full judicial review of administrative decisions, and the ulti-
mate end would have been the effective destruction of administrative
discretion. My second defense is traditional, perhaps textual. The
Court's dichotomy between expectations that turn upon factual criteria
predefined by the state ("property") and expectations that turn upon
the discretion of an administrator (not "property") conforms closely to
the usual use of the term "property." The first of these defenses is, in
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my view, the more important; I will begin this Section with it, and will
devote considerably more attention to it than to the second argument.
1. The Functional Defense. Preservation of Administrative Discretion
The functional defense is simply stated: requiring even a state-
ment of reasons for Roth's interest would inevitably have meant the
curtailment of administrative discretion and a substantial loss of ad-
ministrators' freedom to rely upon their intuition, their impressions,
and their underlying goals, aims, and values when making discretion-
ary decisions.
Before showing that this result is inevitable, I should state the as-
sumption upon which I proceed. The assumption is that there are two
distinct types of decisional problems, one of which is well-suited to ad-
versarial decisionmaking and one which is not. The latter type of prob-
lem is not amenable to the strictly rational, "principled" analysis we
associate with the adversary process and with judicial determinations.
Professor Lon Fuller calls these problems "polycentric" and argues that
they cannot be resolved by adjudication because "[t]here is and can be
no single solution or issue toward which the affected party may direct
his proofs and arguments.' Professor Fuller recommended that man-
agerial authority-administrative discretion-should be used, instead
of adjudication, to solve this type of problem. This distinction between
between nonadjudicable administrative problems and discrete litigable
problems underlies my analysis of Roth.
Assuming that the distinction between the two types of decisions
exists, which type was involved in Roth? Termination of the contracts
for untenured Wisconsin college teachers' was committed by state law
to the sound discretion of an administrator. Nonrenewal decisions,
then, were of the nonadjudicable type. Does this mean that imposing
procedural requirements in Roth would have led inexorably to the sub-
stantively serious result-namely, loss of administrative discretion-
predicted at the beginning of this Section? In other words, would giv-
ing David Roth a simple statement of reasons for his nonrenewal and a
limited opportunity to respond swallow up the political science chair-
man's discretion?42 At first glance, the suggestion seems preposterous.
41. Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 1960 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 1, 4. See also
Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 3; Henderson, Judicial Review
of A1anufacturers'Conscious Design Choices: The Limits ofAdjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531,
1534-39 (1973). The term appears to have originated in M. POLANYI, THE LOGIC OF LIBERTY:
REFLECTIONS 170 (1951).
42. In fact, it appears that Roth's chairman was in favor of retaining him, and that the
decision not to renew his contract came from above. The five members of the political science
department who were senior to Roth initially voted unanimously to "highly recommend" Roth's
reappointment, and the chairman submitted a strongly favorable recommendation. Dean Arthur
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A simple statement of reasons seems such an innocuous and unburden-
some requirement that one would suppose only those who had some-
thing to hide would oppose it.43
My response is that the first glance does not tell all. First, a state-
ment of reasons lets the camel's nose in the tent: once reasons are re-
quired, judicial enforcement of the requirement will be necessary, and
from that, full judicialization of the decision will surely follow. Sec-
ond, once a decision has been judicialized, only the hardiest adminis-
trators will make an adverse decision if they do not have the type of
evidence needed for a judicial defense of that decision. Such evidence
will reflect certain kinds of discrete, factual criteria. Consequently, the
existence of the specific hard data will become the determining factor
in their decisionmaking. Administrators' freedom to combine some-
what less convincing evidence with their intuition will be lost, and their
decisions will turn on substantive criteria other than those intended by
the original lawmaker. These two steps in the defense of my thesis are
sufficiently important to deserve separate treatment; I devote the next
two Sections to them.
a. The Costs of a Statement of Reasons
In his Roth dissent, Justice Marshall argued that a reasons require-
ment would not be burdensome." His notion is that such a reasons
requirement would provide a convenient compromise between the full
adversary proceeding required by Goldberg and the lawlessness permit-
ted by Roth.
The flaw in Justice Marshall's argument is that it focuses on the
minimal administrative burdens involved in actually giving the rea-
sons. Recent experience indicates that even when administrators must
make large numbers of decisions, they can give simple statements of
Darken then met individually with four of the five; he did not meet with the chairman, who
happened to be the only untenured one of the five. The members of the department then recon-
vened, apparently over the chairman's objection, and voted again on Roth. This time the vote was
2-1 against reappointment, with two abstentions. Dean Darken then forwarded his recommenda-
tion to the President, in a memorandum which frankly concluded: "I am happy, therefore, to be
able to make a recommendation that supports the 2-1 vote for nonretention submitted by the
Policital Science Department Tenure Committee." Petition for Certiorari Appendix at 125-31,
Roth; Brief for Respondent at 3-6, Roth.
Throughout this Article I will use the political science chairman as a metaphor for an admin-
istrator with important administrative discretion. In fact, the discretion exercised at the school
and campus levels by deans, chancellors, and the like is at least as important to the excellence of a
university and its departments as is the discretion exercised by the departmental chairman. The
issues before the chairman, however, are easier to visualize and to discuss, and for that reason I
will continue to refer to the Roth decision as if it were made by David Roth's chairman.




reasons expeditiously, without incurring any real burden.4 5 Thus, re-
quiring a statement of reasons in Roth would have imposed only a mi-
nuscule additional administrative burden.46 The real burden accrues
not from the task itself, however, but from the fact that its performance
is judicially commanded and judicially enforced. Justice Marshall
overlooked the effects of that command; judicially mandating a state-
ment of reasons means that there is no stopping at the halfway point.
Without judicial enforcement, the reasons requirement would so fre-
quently produce a hollow, formal statement that the drive to judicial
supervision would be irrestible. Once the courts require a statement of
reasons, they will have to enforce and supervise that requirement.
I can see two reasons why unreviewable reasons requirements
would be useless. First, if there were no judicial review, even adminis-
trators without malice or evil motives might act in such a way as to
empty a "reasons" requirement of any significance. For example, ad-
ministrators could state their "ultimate" reasons without explaining
their evidentiary bases. Thus, Roth's departmental chairman could
simply have stated that Roth was insubordinate, a poor teacher, unin-
formed in his field, uninspiring or irresponsible in the conduct of his
classes or the grading of his papers, and so on. If the chairman had
doubts about reappointment, he must have had genuine concerns about
Roth's performance in at least some of these or similar areas, and could
easily have stated them with a clear conscience. If the factual basis for
the statement of reasons were absolutely unreviewable, even if Roth
and the chairman both knew that other, more serious, problems were
involved and that the stated reasons were not the entire or even the
main explanation of the result, Roth would be powerless to do anything
about it. The statement given would be a hollow formality, but in the
absence of serious judicial review would nonetheless satisfy the re-
quirement of a "statement of reasons."
There is a second reason why a "reasons" requirement not judi-
cially enforceable would soon become meaningless: administrators
could give their reasons in euphemistic generalities, knowing that the
bases for the decision could not be challenged. For example, the chair-
man might simply have stated that, in his judgment, Roth did not have
as great a potential for scholarly success as others he might hope to
hire. An administrator who could satisfy the reasons requirement by
45. Professor Davis reported that, at his suggestion, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service adopted the policy of giving a brief statement of the reason for denying a written applica-
tion. Although this required statements on approximately 35,000 applications per year, the INS
was able to implement the policy with no increase in the size of the staff necessary to handle the
applications. K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 562 (Supp. 1970).
46. For this reason, a voluntary (and therefore non-judicially enforced) statement of reasons
is not only not burdensome, but in fact highly desirable.
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giving such a statement would not give more. Such a toothless require-
ment would not have helped Roth, and would prove similarly un-
helpful to all individuals adversely affected by administrators'
decisions.
Without some sort of judicial enforcement, then, a "reasons" re-
quirement would soon degenerate into a hollow formality.47 And that's
the rub. The judicial review necessary to keep this from happening
turns out to be quite substantial. An example of the type of judicial
review which would be necessary to enforce a reasons requirement is
provided by two consolidated cases decided by United States District
Judge James Doyle four days after he decided Roth. The cases, Gouge
v. Joint School District No. 1 and Klein v. Joint School District No. 1,48
involved two untenured but long-term49 school teachers who had been
dismissed by their rural Wisconsin school district. Although the con-
trolling statute required neither a statement of reasons nor a hearing,
the district's administrator provided both.50 Each teacher met with the
school board; at the teachers' request, the district administrator was ex-
cluded from those meetings. After the meetings, the school board
voted not to reappoint either teacher. Both brought actions for wrong-
ful termination.
As the trial judge in Roth, Judge Doyle had held that, under the
47. The chief proponent of a reasons requirement, Professor Robert Rabin, agrees that such
a requirement would be of little value without substantial judicial review:
If the requirement of a rational explanation is to have meaning it must be based on more
than an unenforceable obligation to supply reasons. Without some form of judicial re-
view, the individual would remain vulnerable to irrevocable changes in status unsup-
ported by an adequate explanation since the reasons requirement could be ignored with
impunity.
Rabin, Job Security and Due Proces.s: Monitoring Administrative Discretion Through a Reasons
Requirement, 44 U. Cmi. L. REv. 60, 84 (1976).
Other writers have suggested more ephemeral purposes. Professor Pincoffs, for example, em-
phasizes that a statement of reasons for an employee's dismissal will show that the employer is
interested in helping the employee improve himself and therefore contribute to the employee's
self-respect. Pincoffs, Due Process, Fraternity, and Kantian Injunction, in 18 NoMos: DUE PRO-
cEss 172 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977). See also Michelman, Formal and Associational
Aims in ProceduralDue Process, in 18 NoMos: DUE PROCESS 126, 127 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman
eds. 1977); Kirp, Proceduralirm and Bureaucracy: Due Process in the School Selling, 28 STAN. L.
REv. 841, 864-70 (1976); Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 269, 310-14
(1975).
48. 310 F. Supp. 984 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
49. Mrs. Saxon Gouge had been employed by the district for six consecutive years at the
time it determined not to renew her contract. Id. at 986. Mrs. Viola Klein had been employed by
the district for eighteen years at the time the board took its action. Id. at 987.
50. Gouge had been a music teacher, the administrator's letter indicated that he was recom-
mending her nonrenewal because her ill health had resulted in a decrease of the district's music
activities. Klein was a science teacher who was apparently teaching outside her primary area; the
administrator's letter to her indicated that he was recommending her nonrenewal because she had
been unenthusiastic about a departmental team teaching program recently introduced in her
school, and she had not been getting along well with some of her colleagues. See id at 986-88.
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Constitution, even untenured teachers must be given a statement of
reasons and an opportunity to respond.5 1 The Gouge cases gave him an
opportunity to demonstrate what that meant. Judge Doyle held that
giving the teachers reasons and a hearing was not enough; the court
had to examine the sufficiency of the protections afforded. He found
that each teacher was entitled to trial on three factual issues: first, the
actual reasons upon which the board acted in each case;52 second,
whether there was any basis in fact for any of the reasons in either
case;53 and third, whether the school board misled the plaintiffs as to
the number of reasons for nonrenewal and thereby impaired their op-
portunity to respond effectively. 4
It must be emphasized that there was no suggestion that the school
board had somehow been improperly motivated in these cases. Indeed,
plaintiffs appear to have conceded that their nonrenewals were not mo-
tivated by constitutionally impermissible reasons. What Judge Doyle
required is the very minimum necessary to enforce a reasons require-
ment. Had the Roth dissenters prevailed, it is what would have been
required in every case in which a government employer terminated the
employment of an untenured employee. The board would, of course,
have to supply the teacher with a statement of reasons and (probably)
an opportunity to appear; these, as indicated previously, would not be
onerous. If the teacher chose to sue, however, it would be a court's
duty to determine whether the constitutional reasons requirement had
been complied with. In order to do that, a court would have to decide
at least four issues:
1. Whether the reasons stated in the board's notice to the teach-
ers satisfied a federal judge's notion of an acceptable basis for terminat-
ing an untenured teacher;55
2. Whether the reasons stated in the notice were the reasons actu-
ally acted upon by the board;
3. Whether the reasons acted upon by the board had a sufficient
"basis in fact;" 56 and
51. 310 F. Supp. 972, 979-80, 983 (W.D. Wis. 1970), aft'd, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971),
rey'd, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
52. Gouge, 310 F. Supp. at 992.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Judge Doyle specifically held that the reasons stated in Johnson's letters were constitu-
tionally acceptable and sufficient to permit the school board to terminate each of the plaintiffs. Id.
at 991.
56. Professor Rabin would not permit any judicial review of the statement's factual conclu-
sions. He would substitute for this a requirement that the statement's factual findings be highly
detailed and specific, on the theory that such statements will be self-policing, because administra-
tors will be reluctant to make very specific findings that they know to be "untrue." Rabin, supra
note 47, at 84-86. There are two fatal defects in his theory. First, it reflects a conception of black
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4. Whether the members of the board did or said anything at the
hearing that in any way misled the teachers or interfered with their
opportunity to respond to every concern motivating their decision.
Some further matters would have to be brought to the attention of
a school board brave enough to consider terminating an untenured
teacher. If the teacher seeks damages, the second, third, and fourth
issues would be triable to a jury. Should the board prevail at the trial
level, the teacher would be entitled to at least one appeal as a matter of
right. Furthermore, if the board guessed wrong as to any element of
the procedures ultimately found to have been required or made an ad-
verse factual determination as to any material element of the proce-
dures actually provided, the school district would face the possibility of
a very substantial judgment against it. Finally, win, lose, or draw, the
board would be faced not only with the disruption and anxieties pres-
ent in every lawsuit, but also with the substantial financial costs of sup-
porting what has become very expensive litigation. All this, it must be
and white "truth" that is inconsistent with the real world. In fact, an employer who feels he
should fire an employee will have no trouble reeling off, in perfect good faith, a dozen "half true"
or honestly imagined factual incidents to support his conclusion. Without judicial review of the
factual basis for the findings, the statement of reasons will be little more than a formalistic but
insubstantial procedural hurdle; it will provide real protection only where the employer is highly
ambivalent. But 4f Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 572-73 (1975) (Secretary of Labor re-
quired to produce detailed statement of reasons for not commencing a civil action to set aside
union election, but factual bases for statement not subject to judicial review).
Second, and more serious, requiring that the statement be detailed would create a horrendous
trap for the unwary employer. Rabin provides, as an example of an insufficient statement, the
following affidavit taken from the trial court record of Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976):
I had [Bishop] in my office on several occasions during a six month period prior to his
discharge, concerning high speed auto chases outside the city limits, checking business
establishments in the city and answering patrol calls.
Bishop did not attend training sessions. . . refused to cooperate with fellow officers
and did not take orders from the officer in charge of his duty shift. Officer Bishop was
the cause of low morale. . . and a verbal complaint was filed against him by Sergeant
Arrowood ....
Rabin, supra note 47, at 90. Rabin concludes that "an adequate statement of reasons would have
required a more precise and detailed explanation of the Chief's decision than was provided in his
affidavit." Id. at 90 n.99. In particular, Rabin considered the statement fatally defective because
it was unsubstantiated and because many of the charges were "highly ambiguous." Id at 90. It
would follow, therefore, that an employer who fired an employee even for perfectly valid and
sufficient reasons would ultimately have to reinstate him with back pay, if the statement of reasons
were similarly "incomplete."
The net result of Rabin's view would rival the rigors of nineteenth-century code pleading: a
government employer who terminated an untenured employee would be subject to substantial
damages and injunctive relief unless it gave the employee a statement of reasons that was "precise
and detailed" (when viewed in retrospect by the trial court), "substantiated" and not "highly am-
biguous"--requirements that rival Pomeroy's "dry, naked, actual facts" in their ability to strike
well-earned fear in the heart of the litigant. See J. POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES § 423, at 640 (5th
ed. 1929). In short, Rabin's requirement would make it possible successfully to fire an untenured
employee--but only if the employer hired a "special pleader" to do it for her.
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remembered, awaits the board every time it chooses not to renew the
contract of an untenured teacher.
It is, of course, possible that Judge Doyle was wrong in concluding
that a reasons requirement carried with it the necessity for the type of
judicial review he provided in Gouge. I think he was correct. Omitting
judicial review of any one of the four listed elements would invite even
honest and open administrators to avoid the brunt of the requirement.
If the substantive bases for the determination were beyond review, the
administrators could simply state that they did not like the teacher's
necktie. In the Gouge situation, if the board were not compelled, by
judicial review, to state its real reasons, it may be tempted to state only
a "safe" reason for dismissal-a reason entirely unrelated to its real
motivation. If it did so, a chance to respond would be meaningless, for
a response prepared in answer to the stated reason would have no real
chance of persuading the board to change its mind. Requiring that the
reasons have a basis in fact would also seem to be central. Telling the
administrators that they can preclude significant judicial review merely
by "finding" facts that are not true would be a temptation not only to
dishonesty but also to something that might be termed "result-oriented
factfinding." Finally, Judge Doyle's fourth requirement, that the board
not undo with its oral statements the effect of its written reasons would
not frequently be an issue; if it were, the need for judicial consideration
would also seem self-evident. In sum, the very judge who, in Roth,
would have given up a reasons requirement, showed us, in Gouge, just
how much review such a requirement would have entailed. Reasons
requirements cannot be made meaningful save by full judicial review.
The next Section shows how costly that review would be.
b. The Costs of Judicial Review
The increased expense of terminating discretionary government
benefits is itself a strong argument against a judicially enforced reasons
requirement. Moreover, imposing such a requirement would entail
more than monetary burdens. By refusing to take this path, the Roth
Court showed a proper respect for the substantive decisionmaking
power of the executive branches: judicializing discretionary administra-
tive decisions would not only increase the costs of defending adverse
decisions, but would also change the bases upon which such decisions
are made from intuitive and impressionistic to factual and easily
documented.
Small-particle physics has developed the Heisenberg uncertainty
principle, which shows that it is not possible to measure something
without changing it. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle seems as
applicable to human behavior as it is to the behavior of subatomic par-
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tiles. An employer who must explain his reasons for firing an em-
ployee-whose behavior is "measured" by judicial review-acts
differently from one who need not. Imposing a reasons requirement
will cause administrators to act in ways they think more likely to with-
stand judicial scrutiny. Judicial review will, therefore, lead administra-
tors to base their decisions on those factors most easily documented.
Such a change would be detrimental because it would de-
emphasize a large number of previously important factors. Suppose,
for example, that Roth's department chairman concluded that Roth
had not proven as intellectually challenging in the classroom as he had
hoped. This opinion might be based on his observation of classes, or
on student comments, or on extrapolation from casual conversations
between Roth and himself or between Roth and their mutual col-
leagues in the department. As I have shown, a statement of reasons
requirement would make unacceptable the chairman's unsupported
statement that Roth was not intellectually deep as a teacher: the chair-
man would have to satisfy a court that this was his real reason, that it
was a substantively acceptable reason, that it was his only reason, and
that it was a reasonable inference from the evidence. Administrators
facing the prospect of such full judicial review would be reluctant to
rely merely on intuition; they would want hard evidence to support
their position. Without such evidence, they might make decisions dif-
ferent from the ones they had originally intended. In our hypothetical
Roth situation, if the routine student evaluations supported the chair-
man's evaluation, he would probably act on his intuition. On the other
hand, if Roth had proven popular with the students, the chairman
might decide that Roth's dismissal could not easily be explained to a
jury. In spite of his intuition, he might choose to retain Roth.
The change in the substantive bases upon which the decision turns,
as well as in the result, is apparent. Without a reasons requirement, the
decision in our hypothetical turned primarily on the chairman's intui-
tive evaluation of Roth's intellectual depth. The chairman was free to
shape his department by following his inarticulable intuitions; he was
free to experiment with his hiring decisions. Once the reasons require-
ment is imposed, more easily verifiable-but no more valid-factors,
such as student evaluations, become crucial. The chairman's freedom
is reduced. Student reviews and other quantifiable indicators replace
the subjective, intuitive, and highly fragile criteria that a department
chairman would otherwise use to build the department.
Aside from this change in substantive bases, a reasons requirement
generates an additional cost. If the chairman would be hesitant to ter-
minate Roth without tangible evidence in support of the decision, not
only would the factors he would rely upon be different, but, as a practi-
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cal matter, he simply would not make what might very well be a correct
decision. The probationary teacher, who formerly had only a hope that
he would fit into the future of the department, now has what amounts
to a right to continue down the tenure track unless the chairman feels
confident that he can demonstrate deficiencies in the probationary em-
ployee's teaching or publications. A Supreme Court decision adopting
a reasons requirement would have the effect of giving probationary
public employees something very much like tenure.
In a recent study of the federal classified civil service, Professor
Frug showed that imposing procedural protections upon job termina-
tion indeed produces this result. He convincingly tied the virtual ab-
sence of incompetency discharges 57 to the existence of judicial review
of the supervisor's decisions to fire classified employees for incompe-
tence and to the required procedures and findings that come with it.58
The heart of Professor Frug's thesis is that evaluation of the compe-
tence with which an employee performs his job is largely subjective,
but the judicial-type procedures that now accompany civil service dis-
charge force the supervisor to compile an objective "record" of the clas-
sified employee's deficiencies before firing him. This record will often
have little to do with the employee's general competence. 9 Further-
more, the very process of compiling the record distorts the environ-
ment; not only is it intensely unpleasant for the parties themselves, but
it inevitably distracts and upsets other employees in the unit. It is
therefore not surprising that the federal employer rarely discharges em-
ployees for incompetence, or that federal supervisors can seldom de-
mand competence from their classified employees. Professor Frug's
study bears out both of my points: imposing procedures has caused a
change in the bases for decisions-"incompetence," essentially a sub-
jective criterion, is in effect no longer a basis for discharge 6 0-and has
effectively and drastically limited the number of such decisions made.
57. Professor Frug reports that from 1972 through 1974, between 300 and 500 individuals
were separated for "inefficiency" from the federal civil service, out of a total of more than two
million such employees. This works out to a rate of 0.02%, or one employee separated per 5,000
employees. Frug, Does the Constitution Frevent the Discharge of Civil Service Employees?, 124 U.
PA. L. REv. 942, 945 n.13 (1976). It is simply inconceivable that the percentage of incompetent
workers in the federal bureaucracy is so low that a separation rate of 0.02% even begins to handle
the problem. Rather, this low figure is simply the product of the fact that it is virtually impossible
to separate a classified civil servant solely for incompetence. See id. at 946 n. 16.
58. Id. at 946 (footnote omitted).
59. The question is seldom whether or not the employee "did it," as every employee occa-
sionally makes mistakes; the real questions involve how often these mistakes were made, how
serious they were, whether the employee has tried to improve his performance, what level of
performance is expected of other employees in the unit, and so on. But "when factfinding be-
comes the focus, the true issues in establishing fairness in employee evaluations are often lost in
the process of resolving largely irrelevant factual disputes." Id. at 1001.
60. Justice White was very careful, in his separate opinion in Arnett, to distinguish between
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I have established the results of imposing a reasons requirement.
Are those results necessarily bad? Let us return to the Roth -based hy-
pothetical. Is it wrong that an administrator's decision be made to turn
on demonstrable criteria? At first glance, it would seem to be a change
for the better. I have two responses. First, intuitive criteria are often
just as valid as objective criteria. If the chairman is free to replace a
probationary teacher when he feels such a replacement will improve
the quality of the department, he will create a department with quali-
ties not reflected by more tangible data. Perhaps the teachers chosen
through exercise of the chairman's intuition will turn out to be less pop-
ular with students, but more challenging; perhaps their popularity,
though lower at the beginning of their careers, will stand up better over
the thirty years or so during which they may be expected to remain in
the department; perhaps they will ultimately make more lasting contri-
butions to the scholarly literature than Roth would have.
Second, the results I have described are undesirable because they
represent an impermissible incursion upon the power of legislatures to
decide the bases upon which executive decisions are to be made. If a
legislature has decided that it wants these decisions to be made on the
basis of the administrator's discretion, a court should not lightly disre-
gard that determination. We can be certain that, in Roth, the state of
Wisconsin had remitted these decisions to the discretion of the respon-
sible university administrators. A "reasons" requirement would have
limited the very discretion the legislature found desirable.
If it finds judicial-type procedures desirable, the legislature may of
course provide for them. For example, the judicialization of compe-
tence determinations in the federal classified civil service, the subject of
Frug's study, was a legislative decision.6" Had Roth been decided the
other way, legislatures would have lost their power to provide for truly
probationary employment. The result would have been the imposition
of a constitutionally required judicialization of the discharge process on
every government agency in the United States-and a constitutionally
required quasi-tenure for every government employee in the United
States. The alternative to Roth would have been disastrous in several
ways, but by far the worst effect would be the limitation of executive
and legislative discretion and the transfer of unprecedented power to
the courts.
discharges for misconduct and discharges for pure inefficiency. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134, 186 (1974) (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
61. I use the term "legislative" in its broader sense. In fact, Congress took the first step by
providing an elaborate appellate procedure for veterans who had been discharged in the Veterans
Preference Act of 1944. Frug, supra note 57, at 959-60. President Kennedy extended similar pro-
tections to all classified employees by Executive Order in 1962. Id. at 960-61.
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c. Roth and Administrative Irrationality
This Section has demonstrated that the imposition of procedural
protections in Roth would have led inexorably to full judicialization,
and that such judicialization would ultimately change the substantive
bases of administrators' decisions. The remainder of this Section deals
with an objection that is sure to be made: even if jobs are not property,
if courts impose no procedural requirements to ensure judicial review,
administrators will be free to act in completely arbitrary ways. My re-
sponse is that they will not.
It is standard constitutional rhetoric that the due process and equal
protection clauses require government actions to have some rational
relationship to a legitimate end.62 And it is true that the Supreme
Court does not admit that irrational government action may not run
afoul of the Constitution. In reality, however, there are many areas of
government activity in which the Court will not test for rationality. I
believe that Roth represented a decision by the court that discretionary
administrative action should remain immune from automatic rational-
ity review in every case-and that this is not a defect in the decision.
By requiring judicially reviewable reasons for every administrative
decision, the Roth dissenters would have held, in Justice Marshall's
terms, that "[t]he government may act only fairly and reasonably.
63
This would have imposed a substantive, not a procedural, require-
ment-it would have controlled the bases upon which administrators
could act, not just the procedures they must follow before acting. The
procedural requirement that administrators state their reasons follows
from a substantive requirement that they act only reasonably; as I indi-
cated in the last Sections, the procedural requirement of a reasons
statement makes sense only if there is a concomitant requirement that
the reasons voted upon be substantively acceptable. Roth, it seems to
me, contains an implicit rejection of a requirement that the government
act "only fairly and reasonably."'
62. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 404 (1978).
63. 408 U.S. at 588 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
64. It is theoretically possible to enforce a substantive requirement of administrative ration-
ality without requiring a reasons statement. The problem arises when the plaintiff can show that
the administrator acted "irrationally," without the aid of a required statement of reasons. For
example, Roth might produce substantial proof that the chairman had fired him because he did
not like Roth's necktie. A court might feel that reversing the administrative decision in such cases
would not threaten the exercise of legitimate administrative discretion.
The problem with this, however, is that the court can never tell when it is dealing with a
"necktie" case or a real "exercise of intuitive discretion" case without a plenary trial. Accordingly,
permitting relief in "necktie" cases would require, as a practical matter, that administrators be
able to articulate and defend their reasons in every case, for plaintiffs could always allege that
administrators' actions were insufficiently rational to withstand the substantive standard of ration-
ality. In other words, a substantive rationality requirement would force the administrator to be
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Before I turn to that argument, I ought to emphasize one point.
Roth's deference to administrative discretion does not authorize the use
of that discretion to interfere with substantive rights protected by the
Constitution. In Roth, for example, the case was remanded for the pur-
pose of determining whether Roth's nonrenewal was in retaliation for
his criticism of the university. In Perry, the Court made a special effort
to reaffirm this important principle: "[E]ven though a person has no
'right' to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the govern-
ment may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are
some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not
deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally
protected interests . . ... 1 Roth does not interfere with this substan-
tive protection-but it does refuse to go further.
This is not objectionable. Many other government decisions are
unencumbered by a general, judicially enforced rationality require-
ment--decisions in which a claim of irrationality is similarly unavail-
ing unless specific constitutional protections are implicated. I will
discuss a few examples, not because they are identical to Roth, but be-
cause by and large they represent analogous examples of judicial defer-
ence to executive and legislative discretion.
Prosecutorial discretion provides a leading and fairly obvious ex-
ample. The prosecutor's decision to prosecute-a decision with enor-
mous impact upon the defendant-is reviewable only where the
defendant claims that it was "based upon such impermissible consider-
ations as race, religion or the desire to prevent [defendant's] exercise of
constitutional rights."66 If the prosecutor's behavior does not violate
any such constitutional rules, he is free in any case to prosecute or with-
hold prosecution for any reason, or for no reason. 7 The reasons for
this complete deference are similar to those which I advanced in Sec-
tion A as justification for the Roth rule. As one commentator put it:
"Review is considered inappropriate out of traditional deference to the
prosecutor's freedom in charging ....
Another prominent example of restraint in the imposition ofjudi-
prepared to produce and defend a reasons statement to the plaintiff-in court, if not through
administrative channels.
Adoption of a substantive rationality requirement, then, would lead to the identical problems
that plagued adoption of the reasons statement rejected by Roth. Consequently, even if Roth does
not explicitly reject a substantive requirement of rationality, such a requirement would be so in-
consistent with its rejection of a reasons statement that we can safely assume that its rejection is at
least implicit in Roth.
65. 408 U.S. at 597.
66. United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974).
67. See Gifford, Equal Protection and the Prosecutor's Changing Discretion: Suffering an
Ideal, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 659, 660-71 (1981).
68. Id at 663.
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cial scrutiny is the standard of review applied to jury findings. Once it
is determined that a case was properly given to the jury, there is abso-
lutely no review of the underlying reasons for the jury's decision. Not
only is a statement of reasons not required, it is not permitted: the rule
prohibiting juror testimony regarding the jury's deliberations is widely
viewed as a means of protecting the jury's right to arrive at its decision
by any means it wishes to use.69 Indeed, it is the jury's ability to act
without having to give reasons for its decisions that many view as its
main attraction.70
The political question doctrine is another example of a doctrine
designed to shield discretionary governmental decisions from judicial
inquiry into their reasoning. The notion that certain matters are not
justiciable because they are remitted to the unreviewable discretion of
the legislative branch has been with us since at least 1849.71 The doc-
trine's deference to the legislature is strikingly similar to Roth's defer-
.ence to the administrator. The two doctrines rest upon similar
policies-policies founded on the separation of powers and respect for
the independent exercise of legislative, executive, and administrative
discretion.72
69. In its consideration of rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, dealing with testi-
mony of jurors, the Senate Judiciary Committee defended its rejection of the House version be-
cause it "would have the effect of opening verdicts up to challenge on the basis of what happened
during the jury's internal deliberations, for example where a juror alleged that the jury refused to
follow the trial judge's instructions .. ." S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1974). The
position expressed by the Senate (and adopted by Congress) is consistent with the well developed
body of case law holding that where the jury could have reached its conclusion by a rational
process (i.e., where a directed verdict should not have been granted), the trial court must ignore
proof that the jury in fact reached its result through an irrational process.
James and Hazard discuss the problems associated with a strict scrutiny of the jury's
deliberations:
If all that went on in the jury room were open to public and official scrutiny, either most
verdicts would fall or embarassing questions would be raised about the extent to which
the law should openly tolerate and sanction deviations from the conduct and the thought
processes of the ideal juror.
F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 310 (2d ed. 1977).
Judge Frank was characteristically pungent in his expression of this same thought: "The
judges feel that, were they obliged to learn the methods used by jurors, the actual workings of the
jury system would be shown up devastatingly." J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 115 (1950).
70. Cf. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 69, at 231: "[t]o a certain extent judges have
represented ... the theoretical law and its rational implications, juries the layman's common
sense and also the more or less 'passional elements in our nature'."
71. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 38-46 (1849).
72. A final example is that the Court now defers entirely to legislatures when reviewing
social and economic legislation under the "rational basis" standard imposed by the equal protec-
tion guarantee. Of course this conclusion sounds paradoxical, and it is true that the Court still
purports to demand minimum rationality from the legislature. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Caro-
lina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978). The Court's willingness to derive the purpose of the
statute from its terms and to assume the existence of facts to justify the legislation, however, along
with a profound, lingering sensitivity to the political reaction to the Court's decisions in the early
twentieth century, have all resulted in what is in fact, if not in theory, complete deference to the
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
In the areas just discussed, as in Roth, the courts do not, and
should not, automatically police every decision made by the political
branches. The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of de-
ferring to the decision of the appropriate decisionmaker, realizing that
courts are no better equipped to make the appropriate decisions in
those areas than the agencies whose determinations are in question.
Furthermore, Roth leaves several ways of ensuring that adminis-
trators do not run amok. A person who feels wronged by an adminis-
trative decision may still bring suit to prove that it was
unconstitutionally motivated. Moreover, the Court's willingness to de-
fer to the political branches is at least theoretically premised on the
availability of popular review; sooner or later legislatures and the chief
executive must account to the voters. Administrators, too, are subject
to control, though of a different sort. Even in the bureaucracy, admin-
istrators who are given discretion must produce some specified results;
indeed, the reason for giving administrators discretion is to enhance
their ability to accomplish certain ends. To the extent that discretion-
ary decisions are based on caprice rather than on factors calculated to
achieve administrative goals, administrators will ultimately have to an-
swer to their superiors for their department's poor performance. Under
the scheme provided by the legislature, supervision of the administrator
is accomplished through the bureaucratic chain of command. A differ-
ent decision in Roth would have given the real supervisory power to the
courts. Such a result would be justified only by a showing that court
supervision would not only be an improvement upon the system pro-
vided by the legislature, but also such a clear improvement as to be
constitutionally required. This showing has not been made.
This concludes my functional defense of Roth. I have argued that
Roth is premised on the incompatibility of true administrative discre-
tion with judicial review. The appeal of the purportedly unburden-
some reasons statement is illusory: such a requirement would be
virtually meaningless without significant judicial review, and, as the
Gouge cases show, any serious judicial review would eventually dry up
the meaningful exercise of administrative discretion by forcing a
change in the bases of decisions. Finally, the deference given to admin-
legislative branches in the areas of social and economic regulation. See, e.g., McCloskey, Eco-
nomic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 34,
38; W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 449 (5th ed. 1980). Though
the policies supporting judicial deference to Congress and state legislatures are not identical to
those supporting Roth, the similarity is substantial: both the legislative and executive branches of
government need freedom to develop and act upon their discretion in those areas where discretion
is appropriate; in a democracy, both branches are entitled to exercise that freedom subject to
political rather than judicial oversight.
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istrators in Roth is not exceptional, but rather is the counterpart of the
deference given many other government decisions.
2. The Textual Defense Roth Property, New Property, and the Old
Property-A Response to Professor Reich
The functional defense of Roth by itselfjustifies the result. I have,
however, a second defense: the Roth definition of "property" is consis-
tent with the historical and usual meaning of the word. In my opinion,
the Roth Court simply applied its common understanding of the usual
meaning of "property" to the "life, liberty, or property" formulation
used in the fourteenth amendment. While the policy justifications pre-
viously advanced are surely more than incidental, I doubt very much
that the members of the Court felt compelled to look at the problem in
its functional aspect. Supreme Court Justices, like the rest of us, have
at least some working sense, if not a precise definition, of the meaning
of "property." Under that common sense of the word, a tenured
teacher's expectation of reemployment is property, while the untenured
teacher's expectation is not. It is from this commonly shared perception
that Roth emerged.
Common law cases arising in nonconstitutional contexts abound
with definitions of "property." These vary largely with the purpose for
which the definition is sought, but there is a common thread running
through most of them: to be property, the interest must be enforceable
by law. The California Court of Appeal has said that "the word 'prop-
erty' may be properly used to signify any valuable right or interest pro-
tected by law. . . ."I' The Kentucky Court of Appeal has described
property "as an aggregate of rights which are guaranteed and protected
by the government." 7 4 In a similar vein, Judge Learned Hand, writing
for the Second Circuit, stated that "[o]rdinarily a person has 'property'
in a thing if he has untrammelled freedom to use it as he wills and may
invoke legal sanctions to protect that freedom."75
These definitions point out that in its common usage, "property"
suggests an interest one can insist upon, rather than one which turns
upon the good will of another. Indeed, a series of early cases, decided
decades prior to the ratification of the fourteenth amendment, said just
that: "[piroperty is defined to be. . . that right which one hath to lands
or tenements, goods or chattels, which no way depend on another
73. Franklin v. Franklin, 67 Cal. App. 2d 717, 725, 155 P.2d 637, 641 (2d Dist. 1945).
74. Button v. Drake, 302 Ky. 517, 522, 195 S.W.2d 66, 69 (1946).
75. Helvering v. Elias, 122 F.2d 171, 172 (2d Cir. 1941). See also WEBSTER's NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY 1818 (1976): 'roperty... an estate in tangible assets (as lands, goods,




man's courtesy."76 Viewed in this context, Justice Stewart's definition
of property in Roth seems natural and unexceptional: "To have a
property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an
abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral
expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitle-
ment to it."' 77 If he has a "right" to it, it is "property"; but if his expec-
tation depends on an administrator's discretion, the state has not given
the type of untrammelled right traditionally defined as "property."
Roth correctly defined such a benefit as something less than property.
What is the alternative to such a definition? In two widely noted
articles published in the mid-1960s, Professor Charles Reich proposed
a different approach to property.78 Justice Brennan quoted these arti-
cles in his Goldberg opinion,79 and the Goldberg attempt to define con-
stitutional "property" is largely based upon them. An examination of
Reich's ideas shows that it was Goldberg, and not Roth, which consti-
tuted a departure from the common historical understanding of
"property."
Reich's thesis was that the expectation of government benefits had
replaced traditional forms of property as the primary source of per-
sonal wealth. It was therefore incumbent upon the Supreme Court
consciously to invest these expectations with the characteristics of tradi-
tional property, so that the expectations could serve functions formerly
performed by traditional property. There were two essential premises
to Reich's conclusion, one explicit and the other implicit. The first was
that property should be seen "not as a natural right but as a construc-
tion designed to serve certain functions . ... ,80 This conception of
property is sharply at odds with the underlying assumptions of our sys-
tem of political, economic and philosophical beliefs. More impor-
tantly, the constitutional provisions themselves were apparently
intended to protect the very natural-right property rejected by Reich. 81
The second aspect of Reich's proposal is implicit, but it is even
more troublesome than the first. Reich argues that traditional property
has evolved from state largess to defensible right, and that therefore
contemporary forms of largess also ought to be transformed into prop-
76. See Jackson v. Housel, 17 Johns. 280, 283 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820). See also Reed v. In-
habitants of Belfast, 20 Me. 246, 249 (1841) (quoting 5 JACOB's LAW DICTIONARY 322 (1811));
Stief v. Hart, 1 N.Y. 20, 24 (1847) (same).
77. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 (1972).
78. Reich, supra note 8; Individual Rights, supra note 20.
79. Goldberg v. Kelly, 399 U.S. at 262 n.8.
80. Reich, supra note 8, at 779.
81. This is shown by Williams, Liberty andProperty: The Problem of Government Beneft, 12
J. LEGAL STUD. 3 (1983).
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erty.82 He uses, as an important example, the homestead acts of the
nineteenth century.83 These acts transformed a large portion of the na-
tion's poor into a new, powerful, propertied class; in Reich's terms,
these acts gave the poor "individual stakes in the commonwealth.
'8 4
Reich urges a similar transformation with respect to less tangible
forms of government largess. He believes that today's poor should be
given the same sort of rights in intangible benefits that the poor of the
nineteenth century were given in federally owned arable land, so that
they, too, will develop the sort of independence and political power
that came to midwestern farmers through the homestead acts. It is im-
plicit in his proposal that this be accomplished by the Supreme Court's
adoption of what may now be referred to as the Goldberg approach.
The problem with Reich's proposal is not its goal so much as the
branch of government to which it is addressed. The changes contem-
plated by his proposal are changes of the most profound political and
social consequence. They implicate nothing less than the redistribution
of economic and political power among the citizens of this nation.
Reich calls for political decisions, decisions which in our system are not
committed to the courts. The original homestead acts were adopted by
Congress, not by the courts; any further redistributions should also be
made by the political branches of government, operating in response to
the pushes and pulls of the political system.
What Reich and Goldberg contemplate is something fundamen-
tally different: a redefinition and consequent redistribution of property
by the Supreme Court. If the Goldberg approach had prevailed in
Roth, the Supreme Court would have given all government employees
a property right in their jobs. Flexibility in the hiring and firing of
employees is a right of tremendous economic value; the consequence of
a Goldberg-type decision in Roth would have been the forced transfer
of that right from the government (and ultimately from the population
at large) to the employees, a transfer no less dramatic and no less costly
than the adoption of a tenure system by the political branches-a judi-
cially created homestead act.
The right to new property and the power that comes with it should
be given ultimately by the people, not by the Court. The Constitution
intended courts to protect property, not to create it. Because Roth pre-
served the traditional roles of states and courts in the creation and pro-
tection of property, it was correct. Because adoption of Reich's
approach would drastically alter those roles, it is to be avoided.
In sum, Roth's definition of "property" was substantially consis-





tent with the traditional and usual definition of property. The alterna-
tive, with which the Court experimented in Goldberg, would have
substituted the Supreme Court for the political branches of the govern-
ment as the ultimate arbiter of the distribution of this nation's re-
sources-and would have done so on the basis of an economic and
political theory rejected by a vast majority of our people.
B. In Defense of Perry: A Response to the Arnett Plurality
The preceding Section responded to the argument that Roth did
not go far enough. I now turn to an objection from the other side-that
Perry went too far by giving courts the final say over both whether the
state has actually created a fourteenth amendment property right and
the procedures due to the recipient of such a government benefit. I
disagree: Perry is consistent with a long line of Supreme Court cases
interpreting the due process clauses to require that the courts be the
final arbiters of the procedures necessary to protect property-and that
courts be free to readjust the procedural schemes provided by the
states.
Before making this defense, however, I want to deal with a possi-
ble objection that a defense of Perry is inconsistent with a defense of
Roth. I have argued that Roth's narrow rejection of a reasons require-
ment for discretionary government benefits was a close brush with dis-
aster.5 How can I then defend Perry, which upheld a requirement that
the government provide not only reasons, but also a hearing, before
terminating a property benefit-even when the legislature has already
decided not to provide reasons and a hearing?86
The key distinction, in my view, is that the administrative decision
in Roth was meant to be discretionary, and that proceduralizing it
therefore would have changed the substantive criteria on which the de-
cision was based. In Perry, the employer had eschewed the use of sub-
tle discretionary and intuitive factors, and had chosen instead to define
the right in terms of discrete, factual criteria. Where the state has con-
ditioned its own future action upon the existence of specified facts, even
if it has not provided for reasons and a hearing, imposing these proce-
dural requirements will not change the substantive bases of the admin-
istrator's decision.87 Judicialization will not interfere with discretion,
85. See supra text accompanying note 61.
86. It does not appear that the legislature in Perry actually considered the questions of pro-
cedural protection. InArnet, however, a majority of the Court correctly read Perry as requiring
procedural protections even where the legislature had carefully considered and rejected them. See
supra text accompanying notes 33-40.
87. If "cause" is defined as including a subjective basis like "general inefficiency," adding a
procedural requirement will change the substantive basis for dismissal. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 57-60. For that reason, where "cause" is seriously intended to include such a subjec-
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because the state has already denied the administrator the ability to
exercise it; judicialization will therefore not have the disastrous effect
described in my defense of Roth.
I do not pretend that the added procedural requirements do not
have a substantial effect, even on non-discretionary decisions. Never-
theless, the differences in this regard between Perry and Roth are dra-
matic. In Perry, the employer has decided to keep the teacher in the
absence of some serious violation of standards. Increasing the proce-
dural requirements for firing a teacher will increase the difficulty of
demonstrating such a violation. The result will be a change in the seri-
ousness of the violations necessary to cause a discharge, since minor
violations do not tend to be as easily provable as serious violations. In
effect, adding procedure changes the standard for dismissal from
"moderately serious cause" to "quite serious cause." This is, of course,
a major change in the substantive bases available to the administrator.
Still, it is not nearly so serious a change as that which would have re-
sulted from requiring a "reasons" statement in Roth: there the change
would have been from "any reason, including an intuitive hunch that a
better person might at some point in the future be found for the posi-
tion" to "some significant (and demonstrable) deficiency in the em-
ployee's performance."
These differences between Roth and Perry seem to me much more
than the difference between "a little more [and] a little less."88 Perry
makes the consequences of giving tenure more serious, but leaves the
government free to have a probationary period in which to decide
whether or not to grant tenure, and free to choose not to have tenure at
all. The opposite result in Roth, on the other hand, would have re-
sulted in the virtual abolition of probationary government employ-
ment; all government employees would have been, if not tenured, at
least semi-tenured. That, in my opinion, would have resulted in a dras-
tic change in the nature of government employment.
Another way of understanding the difference between Perry and
Roth, between increasing procedures for those already tenured and re-
quiring procedures for those not yet tenured, is to analogize it to the
difference between procedural decisions and substantive decisions. It
cannot be said that the decision in Perry was without major substantive
impact, nor could it be said that the results of a different decision in
Roth would not have been in large part procedural. Substance and
procedure are not, to quote Justice Frankfurter's memorable phrase, "a
tive basis, the benefit should not be viewed as "property." See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. at 186
(White, J., concurring and dissenting).
88. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
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great divide cutting across the whole domain of law."'8 9 As I have
shown, though, the large substantive impact in Roth was simply not at
risk in Perry.
Having responded to the objection of inconsistency, I now turn to
my main defense of Perry. Justice Rehnquist expressed the main argu-
ment against Perry in his opinion inArnett: a government beneficiary
should not be able to pick and choose among the provisions that grant
him his benefit, accepting the fruits of the substantive provisions, but
rejecting the burdens of the procedural provisions;90 he should be re-
quired to "take the bitter with the sweet."9
Perry's rejection of this argument is consistent with one hundred
years of settled Supreme Court practice. Three prominent examples
help make this point. In Pennoyer v. Neff,92 Neff had obtained his prop-
erty by homesteading. He took his property subject to the laws of Ore-
gon, and, pursuant to those laws, his former attorney obtained a
judgment and executed against the property. The Supreme Court was
willing to invalidate the judgment and the execution, because Oregon's
laws did not require the attorney to attach the property at the com-
mencement of the proceeding. Neff was permitted to take the substan-
tive benefits of Oregon law, and at the same time demand improvement
of the Oregon procedures purporting to condition those benefits.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 93 provides a more
recent example. New York adopted special legislation that permitted
trustees to commingle trust funds, thus making it feasible for New York
banks to administer small trusts. An important part of this statute pro-
vided that the trustee could obtain a decree settling all liabilities against
the beneficiaries once every three years. In adopting this statute, the
legislature had considered the procedures to be used, and had provided
that notice to the beneficiaries could be given by publication. The
Supreme Court held that the due process clause required that more
extensive effort be made to give notice, thereby increasing the benefi-
ciaries' protection beyond that given them by the statutes they (or their
settlors) had chosen to rely upon.
Finally, in Fuentes v. Shevin,94 the Supreme Court invalidated
89. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
90. Justice Rehnquist limited his argument to cases in which the legislature had considered
the extent of the procedures at the same time that it considered the scope of the right. See supra
text accompanying note 37. The logic of his argument, however, would cover cases in which the
legislature had not made such a consideration, but subsequent administrative or judicial common
law had established the unavailability of procedural protection.
91. 416 U.S. at 153-54.
92. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
93. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
94. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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Pennsylvania and Florida statutes providing for exparte prejudgment
seizure of personal property. These statutes, at least by implication,
gave installment sellers the right to seize goods without notice when-
ever the seller believed the purchaser to be in default-an important
procedural protection of the seller's property interests in the chattels.
As in Perry, the Fuentes Court was willing to rearrange the procedural
terms that otherwise would have controlled the contractual relationship
between the parties; it let Mrs. Fuentes avoid the bitter while keeping
the sweet.
None of these cases dealt with government benefits. Even Mrs.
Fuentes' equitable interest in her stereo was "traditional" property, at
least in the sense that it was not government largess. This, however,
does not undermine the clear implications of these holdings: the legis-
lature may have substantial control over substantive matters, but the
Supreme Court is the final arbiter of procedural sufficiency, and will
not hesitate to alter procedural arrangements the state has created.
Perry represents the Supreme Court's determination that its general su-
pervision of procedure should be extended to test the constitutional suf-
ficiency of procedures accompanying grants of government benefits.
This determination was correct: once a right has attained the status of
fourteenth amendment property, the extent of process required by the
fourteenth amendment should not depend on whether it is traditional
property or an expectation of a government benefit. The only basis for
distinguishing the substance of the right in Perry from those in Pen-
noyer, Mullane, and Fuentes is that the former was an expectation cre-
ated directly by the government. This fact, by itself, should not be
sufficient to deprive the individual of protections that would be avail-
able to someone whose expectations originated in a nongovernment
source.
There is one other point made in Arnett that I want to refute
before leaving my discussion of the case. Justice Rehnquist argued that
legislation granting rights accompanied by some procedure should be
seen as a contract between the state and the beneficiaries. Under this
"contract," the beneficiary, in return for getting the right, agrees to the
limited procedural protections provided by the state. The Fuentes
opinion addressed this point. It strongly suggested that a waiver provi-
sion in a consumer contract could be enforced only if it were demon-
strated that the buyer had knowingly agreed to the provision, and had
done so in individual negotiations between parties of equal bargaining
power.95 Even if Perry andArnett can be viewed in contractual terms,
it can hardly be said that either Robert Sindermann or Wayne Ken-
95. Id. at 94-95.
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nedy "'voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly"' waived the right to
procedural protection of his expectation, merely by accepting the state's
largess. The legislation that ostensibly limited the protections available
to Sindermann and Kennedy was entitled to no greater effect than the
legislation and the private agreements that purported to limit the pro-
tections available in many of the Pennoyer-Mullane-Fuentes line of
cases. Any attempt to apply a contract analysis to this kind of case
must, like the broader challenge to the courts' roles as guardians of
procedure, ultimately fail.
This concludes my defense of Perry. I have argued that the line
drawn by Perry and Roth is the natural extension of the substance-
procedure dichotomy the Court has applied to traditional property for
over a century. Perry is consistent with, and perhaps even required by,
a long line of Supreme Court cases. Finally, Justice Rehnquist's con-
tractual waiver model, even if applicable, would not require a different
result: tested by the standards appropriate to contractual waivers of
constitutional rights, merely accepting government benefits would
hardly be enough to justify a conclusion that the due process clause
should not apply.
III
A RESPONSE To THE SCHOLARLY CRITICS
A substantial amount of scholarship has been devoted to con-
demning Roth and Perry. Virtually all of it concludes that Goldberg
delineated the right approach to defining the reach of the due process
clause, and that Roth (but not Perry) was therefore incorrect. 96 The
criticism of Roth in the scholarly journals has included a number of
serious arguments against the Court's position. Insofar as the argu-
ments I have already made do not answer these commentators, this
Part provides more explicit responses.
A. Criticism Based on History
A number of authors have claimed that Roth represented a sharp
break with an earlier, more expansive approach to the definition of the
phrase "life, liberty or property" in the fourteenth amendment. In his
incisive discussion of judicial review, Professor John Hart Ely observed
that "[t]he phrase 'life, liberty or property' was read as a unit and given
an open-ended, functional interpretation, which meant that the govern-
ment couldn't seriously hurt you without due process of law."'97 In an
96. Cf. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 19 (1980) ("The [Roth] line of decisions has
been subjected to widespread scholarly condemnation, which suggests that sometime within the




important discussion of the Roth line of cases, Professor Monaghan
emphasized Roth's break with the past:
Prior to Roth, Supreme Court definitions of "liberty" and "property"
had amounted to taking the words "life, liberty or property" as a uni-
tary concept embracing all interests valued by sensible men. After
Roth, however, each word of the clause must be examined separately;
so examined, we find that they do not embrace the full range of state
conduct having serious impact upon individual interests.98
To the intent of these authors to criticize Roth for its perceived
break with the past, I have two responses. First, it is difficult to defend
the Warren Court's brave innovations99 and at the same time urge a
strict respect for stare decisis. Indeed, one senses in the criticism a
"ratchet" 'I approach to respect for precedent in the constitutional law
context: innovation is appropriate where it expands personal liberties,
but not where it contracts them.
The second and weightier response is that Perry and Roth did not
contract the protection required by the due process clauses, as these
authors charge. It is Goldberg, and not Perry-Roth, that in fact repre-
sented a radical departure from the historical approach to due process.
While it is true that the Court has spoken expansively of the reach of
the due process clause, if we examine closely the contexts in which the
Court has been willing to act on its broad statements regarding the
meaning of "life, liberty or property," we see that Roth was considera-
bly more consistent with the past than Goldberg. The older cases most
frequently cited for an expansive view of the due process clauses dealt
with the meaning of "liberty."10' The Court sharply limited the reach
of these cases with the right-privilege doctrine. The Court used its
broad definition of liberty, not to find a protectable right to government
benefits, but rather to protect economic interests, such as the "liberty"
98. Monaghan, supra note 2, at 409.
99. Even so staunch an advocate of judicial restraint as Professor Monaghan seems kindly
disposed towards judicial innovation when he agrees with the result. See, e.g., Monaghan, The
Supreme Court 1974 Term - Foreword- Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 43
(1975) ("In short, one could with ingenuity impose on the states through constitutional common
law all the best features of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Federal Rules of
Evidence."); see also J. ELY, supra note 96, at 73-74 (defending the Warren Court's unprecedented
activism in the areas of political expression and association, voter qualification and malapportion-
ment, and protection of "equal treatment for society's habitual unequals"-all because these were
process-oriented rather than value-oriented decisions.)
100. This term was aptly used by Professor William Cohen to describe Justice Brennan's sug-
gestion in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966), that while Congress had discre-
tion to increase the scope of the equal protection and due process clauses, section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment "does not grant Congress power to exercise discretion in the other direc-
tion ..... ." Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN.
L. REv. 603, 606 (1975).
101. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), is famous for its broad definition of liberty.
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to work more than sixty hours a week. 10 2 The cases cited by these "his-
torical" critics of Roth would never have been used to protect private
expectations of government benefits.
The criticism that Perry and Roth contracted traditional protec-
tions is not only unfounded, but actively wrong. Perry and Roth did
break with the past, but not by making doctrine more restrictive: they
actually expanded the meaning of the due process clause. Prior to
Roth, case after case denied the existence of a constitutionally pro-
tected property interest in goverment employment. 0 3 The Court was
historically and consistently very sensitive to the importance of the ex-
ecutive's power to remove employees, tenured or untenured. Perry was
unusual because it hampered the exercise of that power when tenured
employees were involved, thereby expanding the constitutional protec-
tion for property rights in government jobs. 04
In sum, the criticism that the Roth approach is a complete break
with a more solicitous past is unsupported by the cases. Worse than
that, the criticism is perverse: if Perry and Roth are subject to any criti-
cism on the basis of history, it is that they expanded, rather than con-
tracted, the scope of the "property" protected by the due process
clauses of the Constitution.
I should address another, somewhat different historical argument.
It may be thought that Roth is inconsistent with the line of cases culmi-
nating in Fuentes v. Shevin. Under state law, the seller in Fuentes re-
tained title to the goods until the final payment had been made. Any
right the purchaser had to possession terminated upon her default;
thus, a defaulting purchaser did not have a "property right" in the
goods. The Fuentes Court, however, was willing to find a protected
property interest, even though there was no such interest under state
law. It could be argued that this ruling is inconsistent with the Roth
holding that the Court should defer to the states when defining prop-
erty for the purposes of the fourteenth amendment.
This argument misreads both Fuentes and Roth. Fuentes did not
hold that the purchaser had a property interest in the goods. The very
question at issue in the replevin action was whether or not the pur-
chaser had such an interest. The purchaser's right to continued posses-
sion of the goods turned upon the answer to a very specific question:
had she defaulted in her payments? If so, was her failure to pay ex-
102. See, eg., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
103. See Frug, supra note 57, at 961-70, and cases cited therein. See also Monaghan, supra
note 2, at 435 ("Although there are cases which can be read to the contrary, time seems to have
yielded a consensus that the due process clause itself does not 'create' any property interests.").
104. Frug, supra note 57, at 961-62.
105. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
[Vol. 71:146
1983] PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
cused by the seller's breach of an implied warranty to repair the prod-
uct in question?" 6 These are perfect examples of specific criteria the
existence or absence of which determine whether a fourteenth amend-
ment property right is involved. Under Roth, as under Fuentes, an ex-
pectation that turns upon the existence of such criteria is "property."
Therefore, Fuentes' discussion of property is not only entirely consis-
tent with Roth, but can almost be said to have anticipated it."°7 As a
result, this historical argument, too, ultimately fails.
B. The Court's Role Under the Due Process Clause.-
The Positivism Criticism
A number of scholars have argued that Roth is wrong because the
Court, and not the states, should have the ultimate responsibility for
defining "property" under the fourteenth amendment.10 8 In their view,
the deference of Roth gives back to the states what the fourteenth
amendment was supposed to take from them. The fourteenth amend-
106. Id. at 87 n.17.
107. In some states, courts engaged in the division and distribution of marital property upon
divorce are given a very wide discretion, approaching that of Roth's political science chairman.
Under Roth, it might be argued, such distribution does not implicate the due process clause, be-
cause each spouse's expectation turns upon the virtually unfettered discretion of the judge. In
such situations, Roth would not prohibit the judge from proceeding without notice, nor from ex
parte communications with one spouse. And ifRoth would not prohibit these actions-which we
know intuitively must be prohibited-then Roth must be wrong.
While I agree that Roth does not reach this situation, it is largely because there are factors at
play in private litigation which simply do not exist in the context of the disbursement of govern-
mental largess. First, where the government is acting solely as referee between two private parties,
interfering with its flexibility does not implicate its "very ability to function." See Frug, supra
note 57, at 992.
Second, and more important, the risk of substantial (perhaps grievous) unfairness from ex
parte proceedings is much greater in the adjudicatory context, than in the context of the govern-
ment's actions as disburser. In the former context, the decisionmaker will have no information of
its own, and will therefore be subject to being seriously misled by a private party intent upon using
the coercive power of the state's courts to achieve his own private ends-ends which are almost by
definition adverse to those of the affected individual. In contrast, where the government is acting
as the disburser of benefits, the decisionmaker typically has acquired his own information; this is
not to say that requiring a hearing would not usually add to that information and correct inaccu-
racies. But as a relative matter, the need for "notice and an opportunity to appear" seems much
greater in the adjudicatory tontext. And it should be noted that this difference will be particularly
noticeable where the determination regarding disbursement turns upon an exercise of discretion
by an administrator, because in such a situation, the disputed facts presumably play a smaller role
in the ultimate decision.
The Supreme Court recognized this difference between private and public actions in Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679 (1974), where it refused to extend Fuentes
to require preseizure notice and hearing, in the context of a yacht seized for carrying contraband:
"[U]nlike the situation in Fuentes, seizure is not initiated by self-interested private parties; rather
Commonwealth officials determine whether seizure is appropriate under the provisions of the Pu-
erto Rican statutes."
108. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 2, at 440; Tushnet, The Newer Property: 4 Suggestion
for the Revival of Substantive Due Process, 1975 Sup. CT. REV. 261.
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ment, they reason, was adopted to protect individual rights from state
deprivations; by giving the states the authority to define which rights
will be protected from their own deprivations, and which will not, the
Roth rule has all the logic of giving the fox the keys to the henhouse.
In short, these scholars argue that the Supreme Court should determine
for itself what interests are "property" for purposes of the fourteenth
amendment.
Professor Monaghan raises this issue with an interesting
hypothetical:
Suppose that a state motor vehicle statute invested automobiles with all
the attributes of property as that term is generally understood, but also
provided that no person who bought a car after the statute was passed
would be deemed to have a "right to continued" ownership as against
the state.' 0 9
Monaghan postulates that under Roth, this statute would mean that
cars are not property, since their continued possession depends wholly
upon an administrator's discretion. He then argues that if faced with
such a statute, the Supreme Court would surely be forced to disavow
Roth and hold that the cars are property and must be protected by the
due process guarantee. 110 This result would in turn show that it is the
province of the court, not of the states, to define what "property" is-
and that Roth, by trying to give the power of definition to the states,
must therefore be wrong.
Monaghan's argument is unpersuasive, not because the hypotheti-
cal law he gives us is constitutional, but because Roth in fact does leave
the courts a role that would allow them, consistent with Roth, to decide
for themselves whether an interest is protectable "property" or not.
First, Roth and its progeny' do in fact reserve to the courts the deter-
mination of whether interests defined by the states are fourteenth
amendment property. In other words, the state may define the inci-
dents of a particular expectation, but it is up to the courts to decide
whether this expectation is fourteenth amendment property'12
Perry provides an excellent example of this. In Perry, it is state
109. Monaghan, supra note 2, at 440 (footnote omitted). Monaghan raises this hypothetical to
criticize Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), but his point seems as fairly to be taken in criticism
of Roth itself.
110. Monaghan, supra note 2, at 440.
111. See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) (grant of parole
within discretion of parole board); Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979) (discretion to controlpro hac
vice appearances).
112. This point is nicely made in Terrell, "Property," "Due Process," and the Distinction Be-
tween DefInition and Theory in Legal Analysis, 70 GEo. L.J. 861, 896 (1982): "But Professor
Monaghan erred in believing that the Court had actually conceded this much authority to state
law. Rather, the Court's approach still requires courts to determine the 'sufficiency' of any
interest."
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law that would determine whether, as a substantive matter,
Sindermann had an expectation of continuing employment absent
cause for termination. If he did, then the court would define his inter-
est as fourteenth amendment property without regard to the state
courts' view on that particular matter. 1 3 Thus, while state law defines
the substantive bases of particular entitlements, it is federal constitu-
tional law that determines whether or not particular entitlements are
"property."
Second, it is implicit in Roth that the "life, liberty or property"
interests protected by the due process clauses include not only state-
created interests, but also interests "created" or "recognized"" 4 by the
Constitution itself. Roth itself provides an example. Roth alleged that
nonrenewal of his current job would have a substantial adverse effect
upon his ability to find another job, and that this adverse effect consti-
tuted an interference with his liberty. The Court rejected this claim,
but held that if the nonrenewal had been based on grounds which im-
plicated his "good name, reputation, honor, or integrity," it would have
deprived him of "liberty," and he would then have been entitled to
notice and a hearing to clear his name." 5 The point is that the Court
canvassed the Constitution as well as state law to determine whether
Roth had a substantive interest entitled to protection under the due pro-
cess clause. That the state had chosen not to protect a particular inter-
est-here, an interest in reputation--did not by itself remove it from
due process protection.
This is the most important part of my response to the "positivist"
criticism of Perry and Roth: the cases leave a substantial role for the
federal judiciary in the definition of rights and interests which are to be
protected 'under the due process clause. Further, it is a substantive, not
simply a procedural, role. The evaluations that courts must still per-
form-for example, the determination of whether Monaghan's statute
impermissibly burdens individual freedom to own automobiles-fall
into areas we routinely describe as substantive, areas in which the
Court claims no special expertise, and in which substantial deference to
the state legislature is not only customary but appropriate.
113. Seeid at 896-97.
114. Cf. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("neither the Bill of
Rights nor laws of sovereign States create the liberty which the Due Process Clause protects ....
I had thought it self-evident that all men were endowed by their Creator with liberty as one of the
cardinal unalienable rights."). Fortunately, it is not necessary that I decide in this Article whether
the Constitution creates the right to liberty, or merely recognizes and protects a preexisting right to
liberty. Whichever view may be appropriate, it is surely the ultimate responsibility of the
Supreme Court to determine whether a particular interest fits within the term "liberty," and is
therefore entitled to the protection of the due process clauses.
115. 408 U.S. 573 & n.12.
1983]
CALIFORNIA L,4W REVIEW
Returning to Monaghan's statute quoted on page 182 and looking
at how a court would examine it makes my point clear. The Court
might conceivably find private ownership of automobiles so important
that a statute like this, which does not treat the automobiles as prop-
erty, is unconstitutional; it might hold that whether or not an individual
"owned," or had the right to continued use and possesion of, a particu-
lar car, could not be made to turn on the discretion of an administrator.
This question is substantive: whether there is a fourteenth amendment
right to private ownership of automobiles. The importance of Roth is
that it allows the Court to deal openly with such substantive questions.
In doing so, the Court will be free to reject the substantive balance
struck by the legislature, and it would not by so doing depart from
Roth's analytical approach. All that Roth requires is that substantive
decisions not be disguised as procedural questions.
Under Goldberg, by contrast, the substantive decision would be
hidden in the guise of a procedural determination. By imposing a "rea-
sons" requirement, and then reviewing the adequacy of the reasons
given, courts adopting the Goldberg approach would ultimately make
meaningless any particular statute's reliance on the administrator's dis-
cretion. But if rejecting discretion is the appropriate result, it is because
allowing discretionary decisionmaking is substantively unsatisfactory; it
is not appropriate that the Goldberg result be reached without recogni-
tion of that fact, and without consideration of the substantive policies
at stake. This is why Goldberg is less honest and less satisfactory than
the Roth-Perry approach. Perry and Roth do not preclude the invalida-
tion of Monaghan's statute: all they do is to provide a mechanism for
separating the substantive and procedural issues.
C. Procedural Fairness as a Substantive Right
In a widely noted article, Professor William Van Alstyne sought to
slice through the Gordian knot of substantive rights and procedural
protections by proposing that procedural fairness itself be treated as
one of the substantive rights entitled to protection as liberty. Just as
state action depriving a person of his freedom of movement or of his
traditional property must be preceded by procedural due process, so
too should state action depriving a person of his "freedom from arbi-
trary adjudicative procedures""' 6 be preceded by procedural due pro-
116. Van Alstyne, supra note 7, at 487. The California Supreme Court recently expressly
adopted Van Alstyne's approach. See People v. Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d 260, 268, 599 P.2d 622, 627,
158 Cal. Rptr. 316, 320 (1979) ("freedom from arbitrary adjudicative procedures is a substantive
element of one's liberty"). The court carefully relied upon the California Constitution's due pro-
cess clause, thereby precluding Supreme Court review of its decision. See id. at 265-66, 599 P.2d
at 625, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 319; id. at 277-78, 599 P.2d at 633, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 327 (Richardson, J.,
concurring) ("Because of the close similarity in the applicable United States and California consti-
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cess-whether or not it otherwise deprives him of "property." '117 It is
the procedural unfairness itself, and not the deprivation caused by that
unfairness, that concerns Van Alstyne. What is needed is protection
against procedural unfairness, not only when the government is acting
against certain defined interests, but also when it is acting "in all its
protean exercises of power."' 1 8 What is needed, and therefore at least
implicit in the Constitution, is an all-encompassing protection against
"an intolerable margin of probable error,"' 1 9 a "liberty-immunity from
unwarranted procedural grossness."
1 20
Professor Van Alstyne's clever solution would simply do away
with the need to decide whether the interest terminated amounted to
liberty or property under the fourteenth amendment. If the termina-
tion lacked certain fundamental procedural safeguards, that deficiency,
by itself, would trigger the due process clause. In much the same way
that a governmental edict transformed the result in Vietnam to "vic-
tory," Van Alstyne, by a simple declaration, would transform "proce-
dural due process" into a substantive right protected as part of "life,
liberty or property."
While there are technical problems with the details of Van Al-
styne's proposal,' 2 1 his general point-that the Constitution ought to
preclude all "procedural grossness"-could easily be reached from an-
other avenue. If the words "life, liberty or property" were read as hav-
ing an all-inclusive meaning, a position not without support,
22
tutional language, and to avoid insulating our decision from further review, I would rely upon the
federal due process clauses. . . ."). Under recent United States Supreme Court cases, appellant
was entitled to the hearings provided by the majority opinion.
117. One of the more interesting aspects of Van Alstyne's article is the contrast between the
first forty pages of his article and his concluding discussion. In the first forty pages, Van Alstyne
mounts what appears to be an effective defense of Roth, and pretty well demolishes the point with
which he ultimately concludes. In the final five pages, he relies upon arguments effectively rebut-
ted earlier on, without responding to his earlier points and without even noting the inconsistency.
This may simply indicate that those of us who litigate (Van Alstyne argued as an amicus in Roth
against the Court's ultimate result) are less flexible than those of us who merely criticize from the
sidelines.
118. Van Alstyne, supra note 7, at 487 (emphasis in original).
119. Id. at 488.
120. Id.
121. Under Van Alstyne's proposal, any government action that adversely affects an individ-
ual must be accompanied by appropriate procedures. This is true even when the action does not
otherwise deprive the individual of "life, liberty or property." As Professor Williams has cogently
observed, this construction renders the terms "life" and "property" redundant: every government
action will implicate this liberty interest in procedures; whether it also implicates "life" or "prop-
erty" will be irrelevant. Williams, supra note 81, at 25-26. Furthermore, Van Alstyne's approach
leads to the linguistic absurdity that the Constitution prohibits the denial of due process without
due process. Id at 25; see also Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values. Toward a More Responsive
Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 111, 150 & n.169, 179-80, 182-83 (1978).
122. Professor Ely provides historical sources that would support such a view. See J. ELY,
supra note 96, at 192 n.28.
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governmental deprivation of any significant expectation would impli-
cate the due process clause. Such a reading would lead to constitu-
tional protection against "procedural grossness," without regard to the
nature of the benefit in question. Accordingly, Van Alstyne's concerns
must be addressed directly.
The key to the error in Van Alstyne's analysis can be found in his
discussion of Arnett. He claims that what should bother one about
Kennedy's dismissal is not the fact that Kennedy lost his job, but the
fact that "Wayne Kennedy was not treated fairly."' 23 Later discussion
shows that what he means by "treated unfairly" is "procedural gross-
ness." 2 4 At bottom, Van Alstyne's position seems to be that proce-
dural protection, like Beauty, "is its own excuse for being."25
Van Alstyne is correct to say that Roth does not protect any sub-
stantive interest in being accorded due process for its own sake. I
think, however, that he is wrong to argue that procedures are so impor-
tant that even unprotected interests should not be infringed without
some due process. It is easy for lawyers to overvalue the importance of
procedural regularity. Procedural protection is too ideal, too seductive
to be resisted. Look at its virtues: It is symmetrical. It is technical. It
is presumably value-free, and therefore does not require the force-feed-
ing of debatable social theories.
I agree that procedures are important, are perhaps even, as Justice
Frankfurter stated, the largest part of "the history of liberty."'1 26 But
providing procedures is not the answer in cases like Roth. Procedures
are important, not for themselves and not as symbols of the perfect
society, but only as a means of protecting matters of value. These mat-
ters of value are not the procedures themselves, but the interests which
they protect. If there is no sufficiently valuable right at stake, as the
Court determined there was not in Roth, procedures by themselves are
not valuable.
Van Alstyne's position seems to rest ultimately on the notion that,
whatever the substantive outcome, the affected individual should be
left at least with a "feeling of just treatment." The Supreme Court
seems to have rejected this view, not only in Roth, but also in Carey v.
Pophus.127 In Carey, it held that the "feeling of just treatment" (Van
Alstyne's freedom from procedural grossness) was an interest entitled
only to nominal protection under the due process clause, apparently
123. Van AIstyne, supra note 7, at 484.
124. Id at 488.
125. R. EMERSON, The Rhodora, in 9 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON
38 (E. Emerson ed. 1904).
126. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943), quotedin Van Alstyne, supra note 7,
at 487.
127. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
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rejecting the idea that the procedures have an intrinsic value of their
own.
We should remember that Van Alstyne's proposal carries with it
all the costs associated with the Goldberg approach. Furthermore,
where procedures are posited as their own goal, there would seem to be
a very real risk of creating the sort of monster which existed in eight-
eenth century England, largely as a consequence of proceduralism. On
balance, the ephemeral benefits of Van Alstyne's proposal hardly seem
worth these substantial costs.
D. Protection of Dignitary Interests
Another, related criticism of the Roth approach has been that it
does not sufficiently protect affected individuals' "dignitary interests."
This criticism is founded on a notion of the importance of individuals'
perceptions of their own self worthl 2 -- an interest protected by what
Professor Frank Michelman calls the "informal" use of procedures.
129
Michelman's criticism of Roth turns upon its refusal to acknowl-
edge and protect what he calls nonformal goals. These are goals relat-
ing to the individual's personal feelings about himself, the "communal
or fraternal aspect of [his] social life,"' 3 ° and "his relationship with fel-
low members of the group."'' Imposing a reasons requirement might
fulfill some of these nonformal goals; as Michelman says, it could fill "a
potentially destructive gap in the individual's conception of him-
self."' 32 Michelman, then, would impose procedures not because they
might have some substantive benefit but because the procedures them-
selves serve the goal of making the individual feel better about himself.
The view has an obvious attractiveness. In a time of ever worsen-
ing individual alienation, and of an increasingly large, bureaucratic,
and impersonal government, this view would impose a constitutional
mandate of civility, courtesy, even humanity upon institutions not re-
128. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 502-03 (1978); Dauer & Gilhool, The
Economics of Constitutionalized Repossession: 4 Critiquefor Professor Johnson, and a Partial Re-
poy, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 116, 148-49 (1973); Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process
Adjudication-.4 Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957); Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976
Term-Foreword Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8-9
(1977); Kirp, supra note 47; Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process CalculusforAdministrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L.
REv. 28, 49-50 (1976); Michelman, supra note 47; Pincoffs, supra note 47; Subrin & Dykstra,
Notice andthe Right to be Heard- The Signpfcance of OldFriends, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 449,
457 (1974); Summers, Evaluating and Improving LegalProcesses-A Pleafor "Process Values," 60
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 23 (1974); Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 269,
306-07 (1975).
129. Michelman, supra note 47.
130. Id. at 128.
131. Id. at 131.
132. Id. at 127.
19831
CALIFORNIA L4W REVIEW
nowned for those characteristics. Furthermore, it is claimed, imposing
such a requirement would cost nothing: it would simply make the ad-
ministrator talk to an individual before taking action affecting him.
The first problem with the "dignitary interests" approach is a prac-
tical one, and one which seems to me insurmountable. Professor
Pincoffs identifies it in the very first sentence of his essay on due pro-
cess: "It is impossible to legislate decency in human relations."'133 It is
understandable that in this litigious day and age we should be tempted
to look to the courts even for a requirement of courteous treatment, but
as Professor Michelman himself recognized, 1 34 this asks from the courts
something even they can not provide.
There is a second sense in which this proposal seems unrealistic. It
appears to respond to a model of an individual confronted with an im-
personal, autocratic, and above all unexplained administrative decision
that leaves him bewildered and confused as to what possibly could
have happened-for example, a teacher receiving an unexpected pink
slip in the mail. This model simply does not fit reality. Administrative
decisions of this type generally do not come as surprises. By the time
the matter has degenerated to the point where outright dismissal or
nonrenewal is likely, there has usually been substantial discussion and
disagreement, and both sides have developed a fairly good idea of the
other's views.'
35
Another unrealistic premise of the "dignitary interests" argument
is that the affected individual values the administrator's opinion. This
is simply not the case. By the time an administrator fires an employee,
the two are usually deeply and irreconcilably antagonistic toward each
other. The notion that the employee needs the personal exchange with
the administrator to plan future self-improvement, to enhance his self-
respect, or to increase his admiration for the workings of government is
based on an unrealistic view of human relationships. Revelation of
and participation in the decisionmaking process may be very important
133. Pincoffs, supra note 47, at 172.
134. Michelman, supra note 47, at 149-50.
135. Roth publicly refused to meet with the University admininistration. See Petition for
Certiorari, Appendix at 127-28, Roth. In Perry . Sindermann the administration had communi-
cated its disapproval to Sindermann formally and informally, both sides were quite clear about
the other side's views, and (by the time he was fired) there seems to have been substantial enmity
between them. InArneut, of course, Kennedy was fired for publicly accusing his superior of brib-
ery. As did Roth, Kennedy refused the opportunity available to him to meet personally with his
superior. Though the records in the lower court cases discussed to this point are not available to
me, the courts' factual discussions suggest similar fact patterns-at least with regard to
pretermination discussions, if not also personal enmity. See Tupper v. Fairview Hosp. & Training
Center, 276 Or. 657, 556 P.2d 1340 (1976); Hammer v. Oregon State Penitentiary, 276 Or. 651, 556
P.2d 1348 (1977); Gouge v. Joint School Dist. No. 1, 310 F. Supp. 984 (W.D. Wis. 1970) (discussed
supra text accompanying notes 48-56).
[Vol. 71:146
PRO CED URA L DUE PROCESS
for protection of the individual's substantive rights, including his right
not to be be discharged for substantively impermissible reasons, but
they are hardly likely to provide the introspective benefits claimed to be
so important.
The real solution would be to convince those administrators who
do not respect the people they deal with to do so; to teach those admin-
istrators who are not already humane and compassionate to be so; and
to force those administrators who do not act openly, honestly, and
fairly to act so. The task is not to generate more communication, but to
improve the quality of the relationships underlying that communica-
tion. Such a task could not be more clearly beyond the reach ofjudical
decrees.1
3 6
I have so far treated the premise of the inherent dignitary rights
proposal as an empirical one-namely, that adoption of the proposal
will end up making affected individuals feel better about themselves.
This may miss entirely the point made by many of the writers in this
area, who argue that courts should require administrators to reveal rea-
sons for their decisions and allow employee participation in them be-
cause doing so makes a moral statement about the importance of the
individual in society. These commentators perceive the government's
failure to provide participation and revelation as a serious moral state-
ment.' 37 The central principle is that a person must be treated not as a
means but as an end in himself' 38 Revelation and participation are
valuable not only because they support this goal by encouraging the
individual to recognize that he is important in his own right, but also
because they symbolize the government's ultimate morality.
I disagree with those who see the Constitution as requiring proce-
dures for their symbolic value, not because the merits of the argument
are flawed, but because the institutional structure of our government
gives each branch its own role. By and large, legislatures intend gov-
ernment programs to operate without courts. When courts intervene
anyway and overrule the legislative judgment as to how much process
is due, they should do so only for weighty and clearly established rea-
sons. They should be reasonably certain their actions will, in some tan-
gible fashion, ease a problem that cries out for a solution. Their
reasons for intervening, if not based directly on the text of the Constitu-
tion, should at least rest on some administrative legal doctrine.
Failing to recognize this, the "moral" theorists go too far. They
136. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes
on the Assurance ofAccuracy, Fairness and Timeliness in the,4djudication ofSocial Welfare Claims,
59 CORNELL L. REV. 772 (1974).
137. Pincoffs, supra note 47, at 180.
138. See Michelman, supra note 47, at 131.
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urge sweeping reforms, not because individuals are actually being
harmed by insufficient process, but because the amount of procedure
reflects a conception of the relationship between individual and govern-
ment inconsistent with their own. As important as I concede symbols
to be, I do not think it the business of the Supreme Court to impose
them upon the legislatures of the states.
E. Some Final Arguments
Three additional arguments made by scholarly critics of Roth
merit brief consideration. The first is that procedural protections are
necessary to ensure against dismissals based upon grounds prohibited
by the first amendment. For example, District Judge Doyle stated in
his Roth opinion: "Substantive constitutional protection for a univer-
sity professor against non-retention . . . is useless without procedural
safeguards."'' 39 Professor Van Alstyne has responded convincingly to
this approach. He notes that "for courts to use the opening wedge of
the first amendment as a means of requiring at least some minimum of
adjudicative process throughout the public sector would be a poor case
of allowing the tail of the first amendment to wag the dog of the new
property."' 140 Van Alstyne is right. Because a generalized reasons and
hearing requirement would create tremendous upheaval, it would be
inappropriate to impose such a requirement throughout the entire ad-
ministrative branch of government in order to avoid the few decisions
based on impermissible discrimination against first amendment activi-
ties. Such a requirement could only be justified by a presumption that
government illegality is pervasive-a presumption that neither the
courts nor the people are likely to accept. This is especially true be-
cause, as I argued earlier, a decision that is purportedly made on im-
permissible grounds can always be challenged.
A second objection, posed by Professor Stephen Williams, is that
the Perry-Roth analysis creates a peculiar disincentive for a legislature
to create substantive rights. Roth says that a legislature wishing to
avoid a constitutional requirement of onerous hearings may do so by
disbursing its resources on a standardless basis, relying entirely on un-
reviewable administrative discretion. Perry, then, actually penalizes
the legislature for adopting standards. 14 1
While this objection appears logically correct, as a practical matter
it seems unlikely that this disincentive will deter most legislatures. The
"penalty" involved does not hurt the legislature itself; nor does it im-
139. 310 F. Supp. 972, 979-80 (W.D. Wis. 1970), aft'd, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 408
U.S. 564 (1972).
140. Van Alstyne, supra note 7, at 475.
141. Williams, supra note 81, at 6, 14.
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pinge upon the political process. More importantly, the situations in
which the courts will require procedures are likely to be those in which
the legislature would be least upset by them. It should be remembered
that Perry and Roth require procedural protections only where the leg-
islature itself has designated the recipients of the benefits in question,
and not where it has left that decision to the discretion of an adminis-
trator. While requiring procedures not imposed by the legislature may
run counter to the legislative intention in one sense, it does not seem
seriously inconsistent with the underlying legislative goal. The legisla-
ture chose to grant certain beneficiaries a property right, and Perry's
procedures have as their only goal the protection of that property and
of those beneficiaries.
A third objection, raised by Professor Williams142 and others, is
that the specificity of the terms of the grant does not reflect the impor-
tance of the interest and therefore should not control whether the inter-
est receives procedural protections. They argue that the Roth-Perry
view leaves some important interests unprotected while unimportant
interests are protected.
My answer to this objection lies in my argument that the Roth
approach is superior to the Goldberg importance test. An example,
however, may be helpful at this point. No interest could be more im-
portant than the life of a condemned man. The utmost in procedural
regularity must be accorded him during the course of his trial and any
subsequent appeals. Once these are exhausted, few would argue that
the importance of his interest entitles him to a formalized hearing in his
appeal for executive clemency-which turns on unreviewed discre-
tion.'43 It is the discretionary nature of the decision, and not its impor-
tance to the individual, that determines whether or not procedural
safeguards are appropriate.
Moreover, even if "importance" were somehow related to the need
for procedural due process protection, the difficulty of gauging it would
make that approach either unadministerable or simply an excuse for
imposing procedural protections in every case. The issue of plaintiff
Roth's reputation interest provides an example. Under the Goldberg
importance approach, the Court in Roth would have had to balance
"the extent to which [Roth] may be 'condemned to suffer grievous
loss"' as a result of the injury to his reputation against "the govern-
mental interest in summary adjudication."'" How does one balance
the importance of preserving administrative freedom and discretion
142. Id. at 13.
143. See Grey, Procedural Fairness and Substantive Rights, in 18 NoMos, DuE PROCESS 182,
189 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977).
144. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970).
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against "a blemish [to Roth's reputation] that turns into a permanent
scar and effectively limits any chance [he] has of being rehired as a
teacher .. ,.4. In any ad hoc balancing approach, individual inju-
ries will always appear more pressing than institutional benefits.
Where the only touchstone is the Court's assessment of "the impor-
tance" of the individual's interest, virtually all government activity
would sooner or later be subjected to prior hearing requirements, with-
out regard to the effect this might ultimately have on the substantive
bases upon which the decisions are made. In contrast, by separating
the substantive question from the procedural one, the Roth approach
makes it possible for the Court to weigh individual and institutional
interests at comparable levels of abstraction, and to reach a more ap-
propriate resolution of the conflicting policy considerations presented.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decisions in Board of Regents v. Roth and
Perry v. Sindermann outline a workable approach to the difficult
problems of defining "property" for the purposes of determining
whether due process is required to protect them. Roth and Perry are
consistent with the history of the Supreme Court's treatment of prop-
erty, its creation, and its protection. The Roth-Perry doctrine is also
consistent with the institutional structure of our government: sovereign
states define the terms of the rights they dispense and recognize, but
federal courts are the ultimate arbiters of the process the Constitution
requires. Such consistency clearly recommends the doctrine and bodes
well for its continuing durability.
145. Roth, 408 U.S. at 585 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
